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  1	  :	  Introduction	  Why	  are	  we	  interested	  in	  studying	  consciousness2?	  One	  reason	  is	  that	  it	  is	  peculiarly	  difficult	  to	  understand.	  There	  is	  no	  consensus	  over	  what	  basic	  type	  of	  thing	  it	  is	  (is	  it	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  representation	  of	  the	  world?	  A	  kind	  of	  self-­‐representation?	  A	  primitive	  contact	  with	  sense-­‐data?).	  More	  fundamentally,	  it	  is	  mysterious	  to	  us	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  physical	  phenomena	  –	  it	  seems	  very	  different	  from	  say,	  a	  complex	  pattern	  of	  neural	  firing.	  There	  is	  therefore	  an	  interesting	  project	  of	  figuring	  out	  what	  it	  is,	  and	  how	  it	  fits	  into	  the	  natural	  order	  of	  things	  (this	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  major	  part	  of	  the	  mind/body	  problem).	  	  A	  second	  reason	  why	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  it	  though,	  is	  that	  we	  think	  of	  it	  as	  objectively	  significant,	  in	  several	  senses.	  I	  would	  distinguish	  a	  descriptive,	  epistemic	  and	  moral	  sense	  in	  which	  it	  seems	  significant	  (the	  first	  may	  encompass	  the	  others).	  It	  seems	  descriptively	  significant,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  if	  someone	  were	  to	  give	  a	  characterization	  of	  the	  universe	  we	  live	  in	  –	  in	  particular,	  that	  region	  of	  space-­‐time	  occupied	  by	  humans	  and	  other	  sentient	  life	  forms	  –	  they	  would	  not	  have	  adequately	  described	  it	  if	  they	  didn’t	  mention	  the	  presence	  of	  consciousness:	  consciousness	  seems	  like	  a	  deep	  joint	  in	  nature,	  or	  a	  highly	  natural	  property.	  It	  seems	  epistemically	  significant	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  a	  special	  way	  of	  getting	  epistemically	  connected	  to	  things.	  	  Conscious	  perceptual	  acquaintance	  with	  an	  event	  can	  justify	  beliefs	  about	  the	  event,	  and	  seems	  to	  be	  special	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  state	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  Furthermore,	  conscious	  mental	  events	  themselves	  seem	  to	  be	  epistemically	  accessible	  in	  a	  peculiarly	  intimate	  way:	  consciousness	  seems	  to	  be	  self-­‐illuminating.	  Finally,	  consciousness	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  source	  of	  much	  of	  what	  is	  valuable	  in	  the	  universe.	  Retaining	  consciousness	  is	  necessary	  for	  retaining	  what	  is	  valuable	  in	  living,	  and	  beings	  that	  lack	  consciousness	  would	  appear	  to	  lack	  something	  necessary	  for	  treating	  them	  as	  intrinsically	  worthy	  of	  moral	  respect.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Thanks	  are	  due	  to	  Tony	  Beszylko,	  John	  Campbell,	  David	  Chalmers,	  Uriah	  Kriegel,	  Mike	  Martin,	  Carlos	  Montemayor,	  Laurie	  Paul,	  Jon	  Simon,	  Declan	  Smithies,	  James	  Stazicker,	  Brad	  Thompson,	  and	  participants	  at	  the	  2010	  New	  Directions	  in	  Philosophy	  of	  Mind	  Workshop	  at	  Columbia	  University	  for	  helpful	  comments	  and	  discussion.	  Thanks	  guys!	  2	  To	  be	  clear,	  the	  kind	  of	  “consciousness”	  I’m	  interested	  in	  here	  is	  phenomenal	  consciousness,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  there	  being	  “something	  its	  like”	  for	  a	  subject-­‐	  as	  opposed	  to	  self-­‐consciousness,	  or	  the	  perceptual	  sensitivity	  that	  comes	  with	  being	  awake	  and	  alert.	  Some	  philosophers	  doubt	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  sense	  attached	  to	  “phenomenal	  consciousness”	  –	  a	  view	  that	  I	  consider	  a	  form	  of	  Deflationism	  to	  be	  contrasted	  with	  the	  Deflationary	  view	  I	  conditionally	  defend	  in	  this	  paper.	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Strawson	  (1994)	  suggests	  something	  like	  this	  sentiment	  in	  the	  following	  passage:	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  line	  between	  mental	  or	  experiencing	  beings	  and	  others	  may	  look	  unimportant	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  animal	  ethology	  and	  general	  biology,	  which	  study	  the	  behavior	  of	  all	  living	  organisms	  without	  any	  regard	  to	  experience.	  The	  fact	  remains	  that	  it	  is	  a	  line	  of	  great	  importance.	  It	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  important	  theoretical	  line	  to	  be	  drawn	  in	  the	  whole	  of	  reality.	  (Strawson	  (1994)	  p.154,	  quoted	  in	  Smithies	  (ms.))	  	  It	  is	  this	  idea	  that	  consciousness	  is	  highly	  significant	  in	  various	  respects	  that	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on.	  Can	  we	  clarify	  the	  sense	  (or	  senses)	  in	  which	  consciousness	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  theoretically	  “deep”	  distinction?	  And	  is	  it	  really	  true	  that	  it	  is	  a	  distinction	  with	  this	  kind	  of	  depth?	  If	  property	  dualism	  is	  true,	  then	  consciousness	  is	  a	  fundamental	  ingredient	  in	  reality	  (or	  more	  determinate	  experiential	  properties	  are),	  and	  so	  has	  obvious	  significance	  in	  at	  least	  one	  sense3.	  But	  what	  if	  instead	  consciousness	  is	  a	  complex	  high-­‐level	  physical	  or	  functional	  property	  of	  the	  brain	  or	  some	  larger	  physical	  system?	  One	  might	  reasonably	  wonder	  whether	  this	  is	  consistent	  with	  its	  having	  the	  kind	  of	  significance	  Strawson	  is	  gesturing	  at	  in	  the	  quoted	  passage.	  The	  main	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  develop	  this	  deflationary	  thought,	  by	  arguing	  that	  there	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  deflationary	  stance	  towards	  the	  significance	  of	  consciousness,	  which	  I	  call	  deflationary	  pluralism,	  which	  is	  plausible	  if	  reductive	  materialism	  is	  correct.	  When	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  possible	  consequences	  of	  this	  view,	  we’ll	  see	  that	  reductive	  materialism	  may	  commit	  one	  to	  a	  more	  deflationary	  attitude	  towards	  consciousness	  than	  many	  reductive	  materialists,	  such	  as	  Ned	  Block,	  may	  have	  thought	  they	  needed	  to	  accept.	  According	  to	  the	  deflationary	  pluralist,	  there	  is	  no	  single	  deep	  distinction	  between	  conscious	  beings	  and	  the	  rest,	  but	  rather	  a	  family	  of	  “consciousness-­‐like”	  properties	  that	  are	  about	  equally	  significance	  in	  a	  given	  respect	  (descriptively,	  epistemically,	  morally).	  At	  least	  two	  surprising	  consequences	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  follow	  from	  this.	  First,	  that	  a	  completely	  unconscious	  creature	  –	  a	  complex	  alien	  or	  artificial	  life	  form,	  perhaps	  –	  could	  have	  a	  state	  that	  played	  a	  similar	  role	  in	  its	  mental	  life	  to	  consciousness,	  and	  which	  is	  equally	  significant	  as	  consciousness	  (in	  a	  certain	  respect,	  perhaps).	  Intuitively,	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  special	  “glow”	  attached	  to	  all	  and	  only	  conscious	  beings;	  a	  zombie	  could	  have	  a	  quasi-­‐conscious	  internal	  state	  that	  is	  just	  as	  glowingly	  special	  as	  consciousness.	  Second,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  attribute	  consciousness	  in	  certain	  problem	  cases,	  such	  as	  the	  cases	  of	  lobsters,	  or	  certain	  intelligent	  robots	  or	  aliens,	  or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  certain	  human	  psychological	  states,	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  an	  empty	  question.	  For	  example,	  assuming	  we	  know	  everything	  about	  how	  a	  problematic	  creature	  physically	  functions,	  there	  is	  no	  further	  substantive	  fact	  to	  be	  learned	  by	  finding	  out	  whether	  they	  are	  conscious	  (more	  below	  on	  what	  this	  means).	  Both	  the	  view	  and	  these	  alleged	  consequences	  have	  helpful	  analogies	  in	  the	  view	  of	  Personal	  Identity	  advocated	  by	  Derek	  Parfit	  (1984,	  1995)	  (although	  there	  are	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  apply	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  the	  cases	  of	  panpsychism	  and	  Russelian	  monism.	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disanalogies	  too4).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  personal	  identity,	  we	  are	  inclined	  to	  think	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  life	  and	  death	  as	  a	  deep	  gulf,	  the	  gulf	  between	  our	  still	  having	  a	  subjective	  viewpoint	  on	  the	  world,	  and	  the	  “light	  inside	  the	  skull”	  being	  permanently	  switched	  off	  –	  total,	  unimaginable,	  permanent	  nothingness.	  Similarly,	  when	  thinking	  about	  consciousness	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  deep	  distinction	  between	  those	  creatures	  who	  are	  such	  that	  “the	  lights	  are	  on	  inside”	  –	  there	  is	  something	  its	  like	  for	  them,	  they	  have	  a	  subjective	  view	  –	  and	  those	  for	  whom	  the	  unimaginable	  darkness	  of	  not	  experiencing	  the	  world	  –	  of	  not	  being	  conscious	  -­‐	  	  is	  the	  norm.	  However,	  on	  Parfit’s	  view,	  the	  underlying	  facts	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  personal	  identity	  obtains	  if	  a	  reductionist	  view	  of	  persons	  is	  correct	  –	  certain	  physical	  or	  psychological	  relations	  between	  person	  stages	  –	  are	  just	  not	  of	  the	  right	  kind	  to	  make	  this	  picture	  sustainable.	  In	  particular,	  according	  to	  Parfit,	  there	  can	  be	  cases	  where	  although	  you	  no	  longer	  exist,	  you	  have	  some	  just	  as	  good	  as	  continuing	  to	  exist.	  Similarly,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  if	  reductionism	  about	  consciousness	  is	  correct,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  deep	  gulf	  between	  conscious	  beings	  and	  the	  rest,	  which	  arguably	  means	  that	  being	  unconscious	  can	  sometimes	  be	  just	  as	  “good”	  as	  being	  conscious.	  Roughly,	  this	  is	  the	  deflationary	  pluralist’s	  position.	  Parfit	  also	  thinks	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  asking	  whether	  one	  will	  still	  exist	  in	  a	  given	  scenario	  –	  for	  example,	  in	  a	  case	  of	  teletransportation	  –	  is	  an	  empty	  question.	  The	  question	  is	  empty,	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  has	  no	  answer,	  but	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  learning	  the	  answer	  won’t	  tell	  you	  any	  interesting	  information	  about	  the	  world	  –	  more	  specifically,	  it	  won’t	  tell	  you	  where	  a	  significant	  boundary	  lies	  (see	  Sider	  (2011)	  chapter	  3,	  for	  a	  helpful	  development	  of	  this	  conception	  of	  an	  empty	  question.	  In	  effect,	  Sider’s	  view	  is	  that	  there	  will	  empty	  or	  “non-­‐substantive”	  questions	  concerning	  the	  application	  of	  a	  concept	  exactly	  when	  a	  form	  deflationary	  pluralism	  is	  true	  for	  the	  concept;	  I	  am	  therefore	  considering	  the	  claim	  that	  some	  questions	  about	  consciousness	  are	  non-­‐substantive	  in	  Sider’s	  sense.	  Chalmers	  (2009)	  discussion	  of	  merely	  verbal	  questions	  is	  also	  relevant	  here).	  Interestingly,	  Parfit	  explicitly	  considers	  and	  rejects	  an	  analogous	  view	  for	  consciousness:	  ….Suppose	  we	  are	  studying	  some	  creature	  which	  is	  very	  unlike	  ourselves,	  such	  as	  an	  insect,	  or	  some	  extra	  terrestrial	  being.	  We	  know	  all	  the	  facts	  about	  this	  creature’s	  behavior,	  and	  its	  neurophysiology.	  The	  creature	  wriggles	  vigorously,	  in	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  response	  to	  some	  injury.	  We	  ask,	  “Is	  it	  conscious,	  and	  in	  great	  pain?	  Or	  is	  it	  merely	  an	  insentient	  machine?”	  Some	  Behaviourist	  might	  say,	  “That	  is	  a	  merely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  One	  disanalogy	  is	  that	  Parfit	  is	  exclusively	  interested	  in	  the	  practical	  or	  moral	  significance	  of	  personal	  identity,	  whereas	  my	  deflationary	  pluralist	  might	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  descriptive	  or	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  consciousness,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  practical	  or	  moral	  significance.	  A	  second	  important	  disanalogy	  is	  this:	  although	  Parfit	  thinks	  that	  personal	  identity	  isn’t	  as	  significant	  as	  we	  ordinarily	  think,	  on	  his	  view	  there	  is	  another	  relation	  –	  the	  relation	  of	  psychological	  continuity	  and	  connectedness	  –	  that	  is	  what’s	  really	  significant.	  By	  contrast,	  it	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  Deflationary	  Pluralist’s	  view	  of	  consciousness	  that	  there’s	  some	  property	  other	  than	  consciousness	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  regard	  as	  outstandingly	  significant	  instead.	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verbal	  question.	  These	  aren’t	  different	  possibilities,	  either	  of	  which	  might	  be	  true.	  They	  are	  merely	  different	  descriptions	  of	  the	  very	  same	  state	  of	  affairs.”	  That	  I	  find	  incredible.	  These	  descriptions	  give	  us,	  I	  believe,	  two	  quite	  different	  possibilities.	  It	  could	  not	  be	  an	  empty	  or	  merely	  verbal	  question	  whether	  some	  creature	  was	  unconscious	  or	  in	  great	  pain.	  (Parfit	  (1995),	  p.	  26)	  I	  think	  that	  many	  of	  those	  who	  are	  reductive	  materialists	  about	  consciousness	  would	  still	  be	  inclined	  to	  agree	  with	  the	  sentiment	  Parfit	  is	  expressing	  in	  this	  passage.	  According	  to	  the	  Deflationary	  Pluralist,	  this	  is	  a	  mistake:	  no	  complex	  material	  property	  could	  constitute	  the	  gulf	  in	  nature	  that	  this	  would	  require.	  	  I	  should	  stress	  that	  my	  argument	  for	  Deflationary	  Pluralism	  is	  very	  much	  conditional	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  reductive	  materialism.	  I	  take	  reductive	  materialism	  to	  be	  the	  view	  that	  phenomenal	  consciousness	  and	  more	  determinate	  phenomenal	  properties	  –	  the	  properties	  whose	  instantiation	  constitutes	  what	  it’s	  like	  for	  a	  subject	  -­‐	  have	  complex	  real	  definitions	  in	  non-­‐psychological	  terms.	  This	  will	  imply	  that	  everything	  about	  consciousness	  obtains	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  non-­‐mental	  properties,	  which	  are	  thereby	  more	  fundamental	  than	  phenomenal	  properties.	  I	  will	  have	  more	  to	  say	  about	  the	  notions	  of	  “fundamentality”	  and	  “natural	  property”	  that	  are	  needed	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  these	  ideas	  below.	  For	  now	  I	  should	  stress	  that	  these	  real	  definitions	  need	  not	  be	  available	  a	  priori,	  or	  even	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  complete	  specification	  in	  physical	  terms	  of	  which	  centered	  possible	  world	  you	  are	  in.	  The	  definitions	  could	  be	  infinitary	  (e.g.	  infinite	  disjunctions),	  although	  I	  think	  that	  is	  implausible.	  They	  could	  also	  be	  in	  functional	  or	  structural	  terms,	  involving	  second-­‐order	  quantification	  over	  determinate	  physical	  quantities	  like	  mass,	  charge	  and	  spin:	  in	  fact	  I	  think	  this	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  plausible	  version	  of	  the	  reductionist	  position.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  non-­reductive	  views	  are	  best	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  ideology	  of	  “perfectly	  natural”	  properties,	  as	  defended	  by	  Armstrong	  and	  Lewis	  (see	  Armstrong	  (1978),	  Lewis	  (1983)),	  among	  others	  (again,	  I	  will	  say	  more	  about	  this	  below).	  We	  can	  understand	  anti-­‐reductionism	  as	  the	  view	  that	  some	  phenomenal	  properties	  are	  perfectly	  natural	  properties.	  For	  my	  purposes,	  it	  will	  be	  best	  to	  understand	  anti-­‐reductionism	  as	  consistent	  with	  the	  view	  that	  phenomenal	  events	  supervene	  on	  non-­‐phenomenal	  events,	  and	  are	  therefore	  not	  “fundamental”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  part	  of	  a	  base	  of	  perfectly	  natural	  properties	  whose	  instantiation	  determines	  everything	  else,	  and	  whose	  instantiation	  is	  not	  itself	  determined	  from	  below.	  For	  my	  purposes,	  the	  important	  question	  will	  be	  whether	  phenomenal	  properties	  are	  primitive	  non-­‐reducible	  properties,	  not	  the	  further	  question	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  also	  fundamental	  in	  this	  sense.	  An	  outline	  of	  what	  is	  to	  come:	  in	  section	  2,	  I	  compare	  deflationary	  pluralism	  with	  a	  number	  of	  other	  deflationary	  stances	  one	  could	  take,	  and	  say	  more	  about	  what	  the	  view	  is.	  In	  section	  3,	  I	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  two	  different	  views	  of	  how	  best	  to	  
ascertain	  the	  significance	  (either	  descriptive,	  epistemic,	  or	  moral)	  of	  a	  property	  –	  a	  bottom	  up	  view,	  and	  a	  top	  down	  view.	  My	  basic	  argument	  from	  reductive	  materialism	  to	  deflationary	  pluralism	  will	  be	  that	  Reductive	  Materialism	  supports	  a	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bottom	  up	  epistemology	  of	  significance,	  which	  in	  turn	  supports	  Deflationary	  Pluralism.	  In	  section	  4	  I	  defend	  a	  version	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  focuses	  exclusively	  on	  Descriptive	  Significance,	  including	  a	  discussion	  of	  what	  is	  involved	  taking	  a	  property	  to	  be	  descriptively	  significant	  (which	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  cognate	  with	  “natural”	  or	  “joint-­‐carving”,	  in	  the	  sense	  discussed	  by	  Armstrong	  (1978)	  and	  Lewis	  (1993)).	  Finally,	  in	  section	  5,	  I	  briefly	  outline	  some	  connections	  with	  other	  issues	  and	  some	  questions	  that	  need	  further	  discussion.	  The	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  consciousness,	  and	  the	  moral	  or	  practical	  significance	  of	  consciousness,	  despite	  their	  obvious	  importance,	  won’t	  be	  pursued	  here,	  except	  for	  some	  brief	  remarks	  about	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  consciousness	  in	  section	  4.	  Arguably	  there	  is	  a	  rationale	  for	  focusing	  first	  on	  the	  naturalness	  of	  consciousness	  before	  looking	  at	  its	  normative	  significance,	  which	  is	  that	  we	  normally	  think	  of	  these	  normative	  kinds	  of	  significance	  as	  attaching	  to	  consciousness	  in	  a	  way	  that	  depends	  on	  its	  natural	  significance.	  For	  example,	  consider	  the	  difference	  between	  real	  pain	  and	  unconscious	  functional	  analogue	  of	  pain	  occurring	  in	  a	  zombie.	  We	  think	  that	  zombie	  pain	  isn’t	  bad	  in	  the	  way	  that	  real	  pain	  is,	  because	  its	  nothing	  like	  real	  pain.	  That	  is,	  the	  big	  difference	  between	  real	  pain	  and	  zombie	  pain	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  consist	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  is	  bad	  and	  the	  other	  isn’t,	  rather	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  is	  a	  big	  natural	  difference	  between	  them	  that	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  is	  bad	  and	  the	  other	  isn’t.	  One	  could	  imagine	  a	  view	  that	  denies	  this,	  but	  I	  think	  it	  would	  be	  revisionary	  of	  normal	  thinking	  on	  the	  matter.	  (see	  Lee	  (manuscript)	  for	  a	  much	  more	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  the	  epistemic	  and	  practical	  significance	  of	  consciousness,	  and	  their	  connection	  with	  its	  natural	  significance).	  Before	  proceeding,	  an	  important	  point	  about	  this	  discussion	  is	  worth	  immediately	  emphasizing:	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  equate	  being	  deflationary	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  so-­‐called	  “explanatory	  gap”	  with	  being	  a	  deflationary	  pluralist,	  or	  being	  a	  deflationist	  in	  any	  of	  the	  other	  senses	  I’ll	  discuss.	  For	  example,	  one	  could	  be	  a	  realist	  about	  the	  explanatory	  gap,	  but	  nonetheless	  think	  that	  from	  a	  cosmic	  perspective	  consciousness	  is	  really	  nothing	  special;	  its	  interest	  lies	  entirely	  in	  the	  explanatory	  puzzle	  it	  poses	  for	  us	  (Mcginn	  (1989)	  might	  be	  read	  as	  expressing	  this	  view).	  In	  the	  same	  spirit,	  perhaps	  we	  can’t	  ever	  know	  whether	  lobsters	  or	  certain	  intelligent	  computers	  are	  conscious;	  it	  doesn’t	  follow	  that	  we	  lack	  any	  substantive	  knowledge,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  knowledge	  of	  where	  a	  significant	  boundary	  lies.	  On	  the	  flipside,	  one	  could	  deny	  that	  there’s	  a	  gap	  (e.g.	  by	  holding	  an	  analytical	  functionalist	  view	  like	  Lewis’	  or	  Shoemaker’s	  (see	  Lewis	  (1972),	  Shoemaker	  (1975)),	  but	  still	  agree	  with	  Strawson’s	  grandiose	  sentiment.	  Despite	  this	  kind	  of	  independence,	  there	  are	  some	  interesting	  connections	  to	  be	  drawn	  here	  that	  I’ll	  briefly	  describe	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  paper.	  I’ll	  be	  generally	  assuming	  throughout	  that	  there	  is	  an	  explanatory	  gap,	  although	  for	  the	  reasons	  just	  given,	  not	  much	  turns	  on	  this.	  2:	  Deflationary	  Pluralism	  vs	  Other	  Deflationary	  Approaches	  Deflationary	  Pluralism	  is	  not	  the	  only	  view	  that	  challenges	  the	  thought	  that	  consciousness	  marks	  a	  deep	  distinction	  in	  nature.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  distinguish	  a	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number	  of	  positions	  of	  this	  kind,	  and	  say	  more	  about	  what	  is	  distinctive	  about	  the	  DP	  position.	  	  One	  way	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  no	  deep	  distinction	  between	  conscious	  beings	  and	  the	  rest	  would	  be	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  no	  conscious	  beings	  :	  one	  could	  hold	  an	  error	  theory.	  I	  think	  most	  philosophers	  would	  reject	  this	  view,	  taking	  the	  existence	  of	  conscious	  experiences	  as	  a	  Moorean	  fact.	  I	  won’t	  seriously	  challenge	  this	  starting	  point	  here.	  Similar	  in	  metaphysical	  outlook	  to	  the	  error	  theory,	  there	  is	  the	  expressivist	  view	  that	  statements	  about	  experience	  are	  not	  genuinely	  descriptive	  or	  fact-­‐stating	  but	  really	  express	  a	  non-­‐cognitive	  attitude	  like	  an	  evaluation.	  This	  view	  is	  implausible,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  think	  of	  consciousness	  as	  highly	  normatively	  significant	  in	  both	  an	  epistemic	  and	  moral	  way.	  Although	  we	  think	  that	  being	  conscious	  gives	  you	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  access	  to	  your	  own	  states	  and	  to	  the	  environment,	  and	  we	  think	  that	  it	  gives	  you	  a	  special	  moral	  status,	  we	  don’t	  think	  that	  saying	  that	  an	  individual	  is	  conscious	  is	  just	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  making	  an	  epistemic	  or	  moral	  evaluation	  of	  them.	  Consciousness	  seems	  like	  a	  robust	  part	  of	  the	  world.	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  consciousness	  isn’t	  significant	  in	  a	  certain	  respect	  by	  arguing	  that	  nothing	  is	  significant	  in	  that	  respect	  –	  that	  is,	  by	  holding	  a	  nihilist	  view	  of	  a	  certain	  kind.	  One	  could	  be	  a	  sceptic	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  objective	  moral	  or	  epistemic	  norms,	  or	  one	  could	  be	  a	  sceptic	  about	  the	  idea	  that	  some	  distinctions	  are	  more	  descriptively	  significant	  than	  others,	  i.e.	  that	  some	  properties	  are	  more	  “natural”	  or	  “joint-­‐carving”	  than	  others.	  I	  won’t	  be	  trying	  to	  further	  clarify	  or	  assess	  Nihilism	  here,	  except	  in	  the	  case	  of	  descriptive	  significance,	  which	  I	  return	  to	  below.	  Even	  if	  one	  is	  not	  a	  nihilist	  of	  any	  sort,	  one	  might	  hold	  the	  view	  that	  consciousness	  positively	  lacks	  significance	  of	  a	  certain	  sort,	  even	  though	  other	  properties	  are	  relatively	  significant	  in	  the	  same	  sense.	  For	  example,	  one	  might	  hold	  that	  consciousness	  is	  a	  disjunctive	  property,	  and	  therefore	  has	  a	  low	  degree	  of	  naturalness	  –	  there	  is	  nothing	  deeply	  in	  common	  between	  all	  the	  instances	  of	  phenomenal	  consciousness	  (this	  makes	  sense	  if	  we	  are	  realists	  about	  naturalness:	  a	  disjunctive	  property	  is	  a	  disjunction	  of	  relatively	  natural	  properties).	  Or	  one	  might	  hold	  that	  consciousness	  is	  epiphenomenal,	  and	  therefore	  has	  a	  much	  lower	  degree	  of	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance	  than	  other	  properties.	  Or	  one	  might	  hold	  that	  although	  we	  have	  beliefs	  or	  other	  mental	  states	  that	  are	  objectively	  justified	  (or	  otherwise	  have	  positive	  epistemic	  status)	  this	  has	  nothing,	  or	  much	  less,	  to	  do	  with	  conscious	  experience	  of	  the	  world	  than	  we	  ordinarily	  think.	  Ned	  Block	  (2002)	  takes	  seriously	  an	  inter-­‐personal	  version	  of	  the	  disjunctive	  view,	  holding	  that	  we	  can’t	  rule	  out	  the	  view	  that	  his	  Android	  Commander	  Data	  is	  phenomenally	  conscious,	  despite	  the	  fact	  there	  is	  no	  natural	  property	  he	  shares	  with	  us	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  he	  is	  phenomenally	  conscious.	  Alternatively,	  one	  could	  consider	  an	  intra-­‐personal	  disjunctive	  view,	  according	  to	  which	  different	  phenomenal	  states	  within	  a	  single	  individual	  need	  not	  have	  anything	  deeply	  in	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common.	  I	  think	  both	  views	  (especially	  the	  inter-­‐personal	  view)	  are	  implausible,	  and	  they	  are	  not	  my	  main	  concern	  here	  (see	  footnote	  for	  some	  brief	  discussion)5.	  Note	  that	  the	  claim	  that	  consciousness	  is	  highly	  natural	  property,	  and	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  has	  great	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance	  are	  conceptually	  distinct,	  as	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  coherence	  of	  epiphenomenalist	  dualism:	  phenomenal	  properties	  could	  be	  a	  fundamental	  part	  of	  the	  world,	  even	  if	  they	  do	  no	  causal	  work	  at	  all.	  Nonetheless,	  later	  on	  I	  will	  appeal	  to	  a	  view	  on	  which	  naturalness	  and	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance	  are	  strongly	  linked.	  	  Fred	  Dretske	  (2000)	  thinks	  that	  it’s	  a	  no-­‐brainer	  that	  conscious	  states	  have	  great	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance,	  at	  least	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  behavior,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  if	  we	  weren’t	  conscious	  we	  would	  be	  blind	  and	  bump	  into	  things	  all	  the	  time.	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  fair	  comment,	  but	  it	  fails	  to	  engage	  with	  what	  is	  perhaps	  the	  more	  interesting	  issue	  in	  the	  vicinity:	  could	  there	  be	  an	  unconscious	  creature	  that	  had	  a	  kind	  of	  internal	  state	  that	  did	  the	  work	  conscious	  states	  do	  in	  us,	  but	  without	  thereby	  making	  the	  creature	  conscious?	  Is	  consciousness	  unique	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  significance	  it	  has	  (in	  this	  case,	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance)?	  	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  Deflationary	  Pluralism.	  Not	  only	  do	  we	  think	  that	  consciousness	  has	  descriptive,	  epistemic	  and	  moral	  significance,	  but	  we	  also	  think	  that	  it	  has	  
uniquely	  strong	  significance	  in	  each	  of	  these	  ways	  –	  it	  stands	  out	  from	  the	  crowd.	  It	  is	  this	  stronger	  claim	  that	  the	  Deflationary	  Pluralist	  challenges:	  it	  is	  not	  that	  consciousness	  is	  positively	  unnatural,	  or	  epiphenomenal,	  or	  otherwise	  insignificant;	  it	  is	  just	  not	  uniquely	  or	  outstandingly	  deep.	  I	  will	  now	  explain	  this	  view	  in	  more	  detail.	  It	  will	  be	  helpful	  to	  introduce	  some	  terminology.	  Let’s	  say	  that	  a	  property	  is	  
consciousness-­like	  if	  it	  has	  similar	  functional	  role	  to	  consciousness	  as	  it	  is	  found	  in	  humans.	  Similarly,	  for	  more	  specific	  types	  of	  conscious	  experience,	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  properties	  that	  are	  e.g.	  pain-­‐like,	  color-­‐perception-­‐like	  and	  so	  on.	  I’ll	  say	  that	  a	  being	  is	  pseudo-­conscious	  if	  they	  are	  in	  a	  consciousness-­‐like	  state.	  There	  are	  various	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Two	  objections	  to	  the	  inter-­‐personal	  disjunctive	  view	  :	  first,	  it	  comes	  uncomfortably	  close	  to	  the	  view	  that	  really	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  consciousness.	  If	  we	  discover	  that	  some	  apparently	  unified	  category	  is	  disjunctive,	  it	  is	  arguably	  just	  a	  verbal	  matter	  whether	  we	  say	  that	  the	  original	  property	  is	  instantiated,	  although	  it	  is	  disjunctive,	  or	  whether	  we	  say	  instead	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing.	  For	  example,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  unreasonable,	  on	  discovering	  that	  “jade”	  does	  not	  cover	  a	  uniform	  category	  of	  things,	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  jade,	  just	  these	  more	  specific	  kinds	  of	  jewels.	  Second:	  it	  is	  a	  plausible	  meta-­‐semantic	  assumption	  that	  our	  terms	  refer	  to	  non-­‐disjunctive	  natural	  kinds,	  unless	  there	  is	  considerable	  pressure	  from	  the	  facts	  of	  usage	  to	  interpret	  them	  disjunctively	  (e.g.	  we	  are	  deliberately	  trying	  to	  pick	  out	  a	  disjunctive	  kind).	  But	  there	  is	  nothing	  about	  our	  use	  of	  “conscious”	  that	  presses	  us	  to	  interpret	  it	  as	  picking	  out	  a	  disjunctive	  property	  that	  includes	  Data	  in	  its	  extension.	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ways	  of	  fleshing	  the	  kinds	  of	  functional	  similarities	  required	  in	  order	  to	  be	  in	  a	  consciousness-­‐like	  state.	  We	  could	  require	  duplication	  of	  only	  functional	  features	  known	  to	  the	  folk	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  consciousness;	  or	  we	  could	  require	  duplication	  of	  functional	  features	  known	  empirically	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  conscious	  experience.	  Thus	  we	  have	  a	  distinction	  between	  properties	  that	  are	  folk-­
consciousness-­like	  and	  empirically-­consciousness-­like.	  We	  could	  also	  trade	  only	  in	  functional	  constraints	  that	  are	  necessarily	  satisfied	  by	  any	  conscious	  being,	  or	  also	  include	  constraints	  that	  are	  at	  best	  only	  contingently	  satisfied	  in	  conscious	  humans.	  Now	  let’s	  say	  that	  a	  being	  is	  quasi-­conscious	  if	  they	  have	  a	  property	  that	  is	  consciousness-­‐like	  and	  is	  equally	  significant	  as	  consciousness.	  We	  can	  make	  this	  specific	  to	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  significance.	  For	  example,	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  a	  being	  that	  is	  descriptively,	  epistemically,	  or	  morally	  quasi-­‐conscious.	  By	  analogy,	  we	  can	  also	  talk	  about	  quasi-­‐pain,	  quasi-­‐	  visual	  experience,	  and	  so	  on.	  I	  think	  the	  common-­‐sense	  view	  is	  that	  necessarily,	  all	  and	  only	  quasi-­‐conscious	  individuals	  are	  conscious.	  What	  unites	  various	  forms	  of	  Deflationary	  Pluralism	  is	  that	  they	  hold	  that	  there	  are	  ways	  to	  be	  quasi-­‐conscious	  without	  being	  conscious.	  Beyond	  this,	  we	  get	  different	  forms	  of	  DP	  depending	  on	  which	  consciousness-­‐like	  properties	  are	  held	  to	  be	  sufficient	  for	  quasi-­‐consciousness,	  and	  which	  kind	  of	  quasi-­‐consciousness	  is	  at	  issue:	  descriptive,	  epistemic,	  or	  moral.	  It’ll	  be	  useful	  to	  distinguish	  views	  according	  to	  whether	  they	  hold	  that	  some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  following	  consciousness-­‐like	  properties	  are	  sufficient	  for	  quasi-­‐consciousness:	  (1) Small	  variations:	  Properties	  that	  differ	  only	  slightly	  from	  “Phenomenal	  Consciousness”	  in	  where	  they	  draw	  their	  boundaries	  in	  a	  given	  actual	  or	  possible	  situation.	  (2) Properties	  at	  different	  levels	  :	  Functional	  Properties	  that	  are	  either	  richer	  than,	  or	  more	  abstract	  than	  the	  property	  of	  satisfying	  the	  functional	  constraints	  associated	  with	  being	  conscious	  in	  humans,	  corresponding	  to	  different	  levels	  of	  functional	  analysis	  from	  the	  level	  where	  those	  constraints	  can	  be	  specified.	  (3) Alien	  Realizations	  of	  type	  (2)	  properties	  :	  Alien	  physical	  realizations	  of	  the	  superficial	  functional	  architecture	  associated	  with	  consciousness	  (i.e.	  properties	  that	  overlap	  with	  consciousness	  in	  its	  functional	  role).	  To	  illustrate	  a	  type	  (1)	  view,	  let	  us	  suppose	  that	  lobsters	  are	  conscious,	  but	  they	  fall	  just	  barely	  within	  the	  extension	  of	  our	  concept	  “conscious”.	  We	  can	  imagine	  a	  different	  concept	  that	  is	  used	  very	  much	  like	  ours	  (i.e.	  it	  has	  a	  similar	  conceptual	  role)	  except	  that	  it	  draws	  the	  boundary	  in	  a	  slightly	  different	  place,	  so	  that	  lobsters,	  as	  they	  actually	  are,	  are	  not	  included	  in	  the	  set	  of	  possible	  objects	  the	  term	  applies	  to.	  We	  can	  imagine	  a	  group	  of	  individuals,	  the	  “lobster	  exclusionists”,	  who	  use	  this	  concept	  rather	  than	  the	  concept	  of	  consciousness.	  	  I	  think	  common	  sense	  would	  say	  that	  there	  is	  something	  defective	  about	  their	  concept.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  that	  both	  us	  and	  the	  exclusionists	  have	  a	  belief	  that	  we	  would	  express	  with	  the	  sentence	  “if	  lobsters	  feel	  conscious	  pain,	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  boil	  them	  alive”.	  Since	  we	  mean	  something	  different	  by	  “conscious”,	  it	  may	  be	  that	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their	  conditional	  delivers	  the	  result	  that	  it’s	  ok	  to	  boil	  lobsters,	  even	  though	  ours	  gives	  the	  opposite	  result.	  Common	  sense	  says	  they	  are	  making	  a	  mistake.	  Their	  concepts	  don’t	  pick	  out	  the	  phenomenon	  that	  really	  is	  morally	  significant,	  so	  they	  are	  incapable	  of	  conceptualizing	  the	  important	  similarity	  between	  us	  and	  lobsters	  that	  dictates	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  a	  certain	  attitude	  towards	  them.	  One	  kind	  of	  Deflationary	  Pluralist	  (type	  1)	  disagrees.	  According	  to	  them,	  the	  property	  picked	  out	  by	  their	  concept	  of	  “consciousness”	  (or	  “pain”)	  is	  just	  as	  significant	  (perhaps	  in	  a	  given	  respect,	  e.g.	  explanatorily,	  epistemically,	  morally)	  as	  the	  property	  picked	  out	  by	  ours.	  So	  they	  aren’t	  missing	  an	  important	  distinction,	  and	  their	  conceptual	  practice	  is	  just	  as	  reasonable	  as	  ours.	  We	  can	  illustrate	  type	  (2)	  and	  (3)	  DP	  views	  by	  considering	  beings	  that	  are	  mere	  
superficial	  duplicates	  of	  us	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  enjoy	  a	  consciousness-­‐like	  functional	  property,	  but	  beyond	  that	  they	  have	  nothing	  in	  common	  with	  us.	  Different	  kinds	  of	  consciousness-­‐like	  properties	  generate	  different	  kinds	  of	  mere	  superficial	  duplication.	  A	  mere	  folk	  functional	  duplicate	  has	  internal	  states	  that	  play	  causal	  roles	  corresponding	  to	  common	  sense	  platitudes	  about	  the	  causal	  roles	  of	  folk-­‐psychological	  states	  like	  beliefs	  and	  desires;	  but	  this	  architecture	  is	  realized	  in	  them	  in	  completely	  different	  way	  from	  in	  us	  (perhaps	  subject	  to	  certain	  constraints6).	  This	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  architecture	  that	  Block	  discusses	  in	  his	  (2002),	  as	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  android	  Commander	  Data.	  By	  contrast,	  a	  mere	  empirical	  duplicate	  has	  a	  psychological	  architecture	  superficially	  like	  the	  one	  that	  we	  discover	  through	  empirical	  research	  is	  associated	  with	  consciousness,	  but	  is	  otherwise	  as	  different	  from	  us	  as	  possible.	  For	  example,	  we	  can	  imagine	  a	  creature	  that	  has	  relatively	  modularized	  perceptual	  processing	  that	  feeds	  information	  via	  a	  selective	  mechanism	  into	  a	  short-­‐term	  memory	  store	  that	  is	  then	  either	  placed	  in	  long-­‐term	  storage	  or	  used	  in	  other	  information	  processing	  tasks	  that	  lead	  to	  actions.	  But	  beyond	  this	  kind	  of	  high-­‐level	  similarity,	  the	  architecture	  is	  realized	  in	  a	  completely	  different	  way	  in	  us.	  If	  we	  reject	  the	  view	  that	  each	  kind	  of	  superficial	  duplication	  is	  sufficient	  for	  consciousness	  (and	  we	  reject	  the	  intra-­‐personal	  disjunctive	  view	  canvassed	  above	  (see	  footnote7)),	  then	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  an	  alien	  or	  robot	  that	  merely	  duplicated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  In	  his	  (2002)	  discussion	  Block	  limits	  the	  extension	  of	  “folk	  functional	  duplicate”	  in	  a	  way	  that	  excludes	  various	  odd	  cases	  where	  we	  have	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  being	  in	  question	  isn’t	  conscious	  –	  for	  example,	  the	  case	  where	  the	  folk-­‐functional	  architecture	  is	  realized	  by	  a	  head	  full	  of	  little	  homunculus	  creatures	  communicating	  with	  each	  other.	  For	  my	  purposes	  the	  important	  issue	  is	  whether	  a	  homunculus	  headed	  creature	  is	  quasi-­‐conscious	  but	  not	  conscious.	  A	  proponent	  of	  a	  type	  2	  view	  who	  has	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  homunculus	  head	  is	  neither	  conscious	  nor	  quasi-­‐conscious	  may	  wish	  to	  limit	  the	  extension	  of	  “folk-­‐functional	  duplicate”	  in	  a	  way	  similar	  to	  Block,	  so	  that	  having	  such	  an	  architecture	  really	  is	  sufficient	  for	  being	  quasi-­‐conscious.	  7	  Some	  theorists,	  such	  as	  Block,	  take	  seriously	  the	  thought	  that	  although	  Superficialism	  is	  false,	  consciousness	  might	  nonetheless	  be	  disjunctively	  realized	  in	  a	  way	  that	  means	  our	  alien	  or	  robot	  is	  conscious.	  For	  the	  reductionist,	  this	  means	  taking	  consciousness	  to	  be	  a	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us	  in	  one	  of	  these	  ways	  would	  not	  be	  phenomenally	  conscious.	  I’ll	  return	  below	  to	  whether	  this	  rejection	  of	  a	  “Superficialist”	  view	  of	  consciousness	  is	  plausible.	  For	  now,	  let’s	  consider	  how	  we	  would	  ordinarily	  think	  about	  these	  aliens	  or	  robots,	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  they	  aren’t	  conscious.	  Common-­‐sense	  says	  that	  us	  and	  the	  aliens	  are	  on	  either	  side	  of	  deep	  gulf	  in	  nature,	  lacking	  a	  property	  that	  is	  extremely	  significant	  in	  various	  ways.	  For	  example,	  because	  all	  is	  dark	  within,	  their	  mental	  lives	  are	  massively	  epistemically	  impoverished,	  and	  they	  fail	  to	  have	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  human	  beings.	  A	  type	  2	  or	  3	  Deflationary	  Pluralist	  disagrees.	  According	  to	  them,	  at	  least	  some	  such	  unconscious	  aliens	  still	  have	  a	  consciousness-­‐like	  property	  that	  is	  equally	  significant	  as	  consciousness.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  that	  consciousness	  (our	  “consciousness”)	  involves	  a	  distinctive	  kind	  of	  globally	  synchronized	  40	  hz	  neural	  firing	  that	  implements	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  integration	  of	  information	  from	  different	  cognitive	  modules.	  The	  aliens	  don’t	  have	  this,	  but	  they	  may	  have	  an	  equally	  interesting	  property	  that	  implements	  the	  superficial	  role	  of	  consciousness	  in	  them	  (an	  instance	  of	  a	  type	  3	  view).	  Perhaps	  they	  don’t	  have	  anything	  like	  neurons,	  and	  so	  although	  they	  have	  informational	  integration,	  it’s	  not	  achieved	  by	  anything	  like	  synchronized	  firing.	  So	  (let’s	  assume)	  they	  aren’t	  conscious	  :	  we	  can’t	  say	  there’s	  anything	  it’s	  like	  for	  them.	  But	  maybe	  there	  is	  something	  it’s	  schlike	  for	  them!	  We	  can	  illustrate	  the	  difference	  between	  type	  (2)	  view	  and	  a	  type	  (3)	  view	  as	  follows.	  A	  type	  (2)	  theorist	  is	  a	  pluralist	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  different	  consciousness-­‐like	  properties	  that	  humans	  actually	  instantiate.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  single	  property	  or	  level	  of	  description	  of	  our	  cognition	  that	  pops	  out	  as	  special,	  the	  level	  where	  consciousness	  resides.	  By	  contrast,	  a	  type	  (3)	  theorist	  focuses	  on	  alien	  properties	  that	  we	  don’t	  instantiate.	  It	  is	  consistent	  with	  their	  deflationary	  view	  that	  there	  really	  is	  a	  single	  special	  consciousness-­‐like	  property	  that	  stands	  out	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  properties	  we	  instantiate.	  Perhaps	  consciousness	  really	  is	  special	  relative	  to	  anything	  else	  we	  know	  about	  (it	  is	  “locally	  outstanding”).	  It’s	  just	  that	  an	  alien	  could	  enjoy	  a	  different	  consciousness-­‐like	  property	  that	  stands	  out	  just	  as	  much.	  	  Their	  quasi-­‐consciousness	  is	  just	  as	  deep	  a	  joint	  in	  nature,	  or	  is	  just	  as	  epistemically	  or	  morally	  significant	  as	  conscious	  states	  are	  for	  us.	  Among	  consciousness-­‐like	  properties,	  consciousness	  might	  be	  locally,	  but	  not	  globally	  outstanding.	  These	  are	  the	  kinds	  of	  “consciousness-­‐like”	  properties	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  (there	  may	  be	  viable	  versions	  of	  DP	  which	  involves	  other	  kinds).	  A	  type	  (1)	  DP	  view	  that	  limits	  itself	  to	  “small	  variations”	  on	  consciousness	  ought	  to	  be	  the	  least	  controversial	  version	  of	  the	  view.	  How	  could	  a	  property	  that	  is	  only	  very	  slightly	  different	  from	  consciousness	  be	  much	  less	  significant	  than	  consciousness?	  I	  imagine	  that	  on	  reflection,	  most	  materialists	  will	  accept	  this	  position,	  even	  if	  in	  some	  ways	  it	  conflicts	  with	  common	  sense.	  Therefore,	  I’ll	  focus	  in	  what	  follows	  on	  type	  2	  and	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  disjunctive	  (and	  therefore	  highly	  unnatural)	  property,	  a	  view	  I	  rejected	  for	  reasons	  given	  in	  footnote	  4.	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versions	  of	  the	  view,	  which	  may	  seem	  more	  radically	  revisionary	  of	  common	  sense	  than	  a	  mere	  commitment	  to	  a	  reductive	  materialist	  view	  would	  seem	  to	  entail.	  It’s	  important	  to	  note	  that	  a	  Deflationary	  Pluralist	  needn’t	  hold	  the	  view	  that	  there	  is	  some	  natural	  property,	  such	  as	  a	  particular	  consciousness-­‐like	  functional	  organization,	  that	  all	  and	  only	  quasi-­‐conscious	  beings	  have	  in	  common	  (at	  least,	  not	  beyond	  the	  2nd	  order	  property	  of	  having	  a	  significant	  consciousness-­‐like	  property).	  The	  only	  1st	  order	  property	  in	  common	  to	  all	  possible	  quasi-­‐conscious	  beings	  might	  be	  a	  disjunction	  of	  consciousness-­‐like	  properties	  (this	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  situation	  we	  have	  with	  the	  2nd	  order	  property	  of	  “instantiating	  a	  fundamental	  property”).	  This	  fact	  is	  important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  when	  assessing	  the	  Superficialist	  response	  to	  DP,	  which	  says	  that	  all	  the	  allegedly	  unconscious	  yet	  quasi-­‐conscious	  aliens	  we	  are	  considering	  are	  really	  conscious	  after	  all	  –	  their	  superficial	  functional	  organization	  is	  sufficient	  for	  consciousness.	  That	  is,	  consciousness	  is	  a	  sufficiently	  broad	  kind	  that	  it	  includes	  all	  instances	  of	  quasi-­‐consciousness.	  Against	  this,	  consider	  a	  version	  of	  DP	  on	  which	  there	  is	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  consciousness-­‐like	  properties	  that	  are	  as	  significant	  (in	  some	  respect)	  as	  consciousness.	  Assuming	  that	  consciousness	  isn’t	  a	  disjunctive	  property,	  the	  proponent	  of	  the	  Superficialist	  response	  will	  have	  to	  hold	  that	  there	  is	  a	  natural	  property	  sufficient	  for	  consciousness	  that	  is	  shared	  by	  all	  the	  corresponding	  quasi-­‐conscious	  beings	  (and	  which	  may	  belong	  to	  other	  creatures	  as	  well).	  The	  trouble	  is	  that	  this	  is	  might	  have	  to	  be	  an	  extremely	  abstract	  functional	  property,	  e.g.	  more	  abstract	  than	  a	  property	  that	  is	  sufficient	  for	  folk-­‐functional	  duplication.	  For	  example,	  following	  Mclaughlin	  (2003),	  consider	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  instinctively	  confident	  that	  a	  human	  baby	  is	  conscious,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  not	  a	  folk-­‐functional	  duplicate	  of	  a	  human	  adult.	  Consider	  a	  Deflationary	  Pluralist	  view	  on	  which	  both	  Block’s	  Commander	  Data	  and	  such	  a	  human	  baby	  are	  quasi-­‐conscious.	  They	  might	  have	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  extremely	  abstract	  functional	  architecture	  in	  common,	  perhaps	  an	  architecture	  that	  they	  share	  with	  a	  bumble	  bee	  or	  a	  smartphone.	  So,	  holding	  they	  are	  both	  conscious	  seems	  to	  lead	  to	  radical	  
superficialism.	  	  Against	  this	  view,	  we	  might	  think	  it	  implausible	  that	  the	  bumble	  bee	  has	  consciousness,	  or	  at	  least	  think	  that	  if	  it	  does,	  consciousness	  is	  such	  an	  abstract	  property	  that	  we	  have	  an	  independent	  reason	  to	  doubt	  whether	  it	  really	  is	  significant.	  Compare	  this	  with	  a	  Deflationary	  Pluralist	  view	  on	  which,	  although	  one	  out	  of	  the	  baby	  or	  Data	  is	  not	  conscious,	  they	  both	  have	  different	  consciousness-­‐like	  internal	  states	  that	  are	  as	  significant	  as	  consciousness.	  That	  is,	  they	  are	  quasi-­‐conscious	  in	  virtue	  of	  different	  resemblances	  with	  an	  adult	  human.	  This	  strikes	  me	  as	  a	  much	  more	  attractive	  view	  than	  the	  corresponding	  radical	  form	  of	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Superficialism.	  (A	  different	  way	  to	  reply	  to	  the	  Superficialist	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  view	  isn’t	  really	  inconsistent	  with	  Deflationary	  Pluralism	  (see	  footnote)8.)	  I	  mentioned	  earlier	  than	  if	  DP	  is	  true,	  then	  asking	  whether	  a	  creature	  is	  conscious	  in	  some	  problem	  case	  could	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  asking	  an	  empty	  question:	  a	  question	  whose	  answer	  doesn’t	  tell	  us	  where	  a	  significant	  boundary	  lies.	  The	  reason	  why	  the	  question	  whether	  a	  creature	  is	  conscious	  seems	  so	  significant	  is	  that	  we	  think	  lacking	  consciousness	  means	  lacking	  a	  state	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  significance	  that	  consciousness	  has.	  But	  if	  lacking	  consciousness	  is	  consistent	  with	  having	  a	  form	  of	  quasi-­‐consciousness	  that	  “glows”	  just	  as	  much	  as	  consciousness	  does,	  then	  the	  boundary	  between	  conscious	  beings	  and	  the	  rest	  isn’t	  as	  significant	  as	  we	  ordinarily	  think.	  Hence,	  learning	  that	  a	  being	  isn’t	  conscious	  isn’t	  necessarily	  as	  deeply	  informative	  as	  it	  might	  seem;	  indeed	  it	  may	  not	  be	  informative	  at	  all	  (more	  on	  this	  below).	  In	  this	  sense,	  DP	  could	  imply	  that	  some	  questions	  about	  the	  boundaries	  of	  consciousness	  are	  empty.	  Many	  readers	  might	  reasonably	  be	  wondering	  how	  the	  claim	  that	  some	  debates	  about	  consciousness	  are	  empty	  or	  insubstantive	  relates	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  certain	  propositions	  about	  consciousness	  aren’t	  determinately	  true,	  or	  that	  the	  corresponding	  questions	  have	  no	  answer.	  Before	  proceeding,	  it’ll	  be	  worth	  making	  a	  few	  brief	  remarks	  about	  this.	  The	  claim	  that	  “phenomenal	  consciousness”	  is	  vague	  or	  indeterminate	  is	  different	  from	  the	  uncontroversial	  claim	  that	  “consciousness”	  is	  an	  ambiguous	  term	  in	  English	  (here,	  as	  I	  hope	  is	  clear,	  I	  am	  intending	  to	  use	  it	  to	  refer	  to	  phenomenal	  
consciousness,	  rather	  than	  alertness,	  responsiveness	  or	  self-­‐awareness,	  to	  mention	  a	  few	  other	  candidate	  disambiguations).	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  intuition	  that	  many	  people	  have	  that	  it	  can’t	  be	  indeterminate	  whether	  there	  is	  something	  its	  like	  to	  be	  some	  creature.	  Either	  the	  lights	  are	  turned	  on	  inside	  or	  they	  aren’t	  (fading	  or	  faint	  consciousness	  isn’t	  a	  relevant	  example,	  because	  it’s	  still	  determinately	  a	  form	  of	  consciousness).	  Furthermore,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  probably	  true	  that	  this	  feeling	  of	  a	  sharp	  divide	  is	  at	  least	  a	  factor	  in	  explaining	  why	  consciousness	  seems	  like	  a	  deep	  divide.	  	  We	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  be	  skeptical	  of	  these	  intuitions	  if	  we	  are	  reductive	  materialists.	  For	  the	  RM,	  the	  presence	  of	  consciousness	  presumably	  depends	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  number	  of	  continuously	  variable	  physical	  magnitudes,	  meaning	  that	  the	  location	  of	  any	  sharp	  boundary	  for	  consciousness	  will	  be	  highly	  arbitrary.	  Furthermore,	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  can’t	  conceive	  “from	  the	  inside”	  of	  being	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Suppose	  that	  a	  suitably	  radical	  form	  of	  Superficialism	  is	  true.	  There	  could	  still	  be	  a	  class	  of	  “consciousness-­‐like”	  states	  that	  are	  equally	  significant	  as	  consciousness;	  its	  just	  that	  having	  one	  of	  these	  states	  will	  require	  being	  conscious:	  that	  is,	  quasi-­‐consciousness	  will	  require	  consciousness.	  Still,	  if	  we	  imagine	  an	  impartial	  observer	  comparing	  us	  with	  an	  alien	  that	  merely	  superficially	  duplicates	  us,	  they	  probably	  wouldn’t	  see	  the	  properties	  we	  share	  in	  common	  as	  greatly	  more	  significant	  than	  those	  that	  differ	  between	  us.	  In	  this	  way,	  even	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Radical	  Superficialism,	  we	  can	  still	  argue	  for	  something	  like	  a	  Deflationary	  Pluralist	  view.	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indeterminately	  conscious	  might	  be	  no	  better	  evidence	  that	  this	  is	  impossible,	  than	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  can’t	  conceive	  of	  being	  not	  conscious	  “from	  the	  inside”	  is	  evidence	  that	  that	  is	  impossible.	  In	  both	  cases,	  this	  inconceivability	  is	  probably	  telling	  us	  more	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  “imagination	  from	  the	  inside”	  than	  the	  nature	  of	  consciousness	  itself	  (having	  said	  this,	  there	  are	  considerations	  that	  suggest	  that	  indeterminate	  consciousness	  a	  very	  unusual	  case	  of	  indeterminacy9).	  The	  Deflationary	  Pluralist	  view	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  view	  that	  “phenomenal	  consciousness”	  is	  indeterminate,	  but	  it	  is	  importantly	  different.	  On	  certain	  meta-­‐semantic	  assumptions,	  such	  as	  Lewis’s	  theory	  that	  reference	  is	  determined	  by	  a	  trade	  off	  between	  fit	  with	  usage	  and	  naturalness,	  if	  we	  enjoy	  a	  single	  highly	  natural	  consciousness-­‐like	  property,	  then	  this	  property	  will	  act	  as	  a	  “semantic	  magnet”	  for	  our	  term	  “consciousness”,	  and	  it	  will	  therefore	  almost	  certainly	  have	  a	  determinate	  referent.	  But	  if	  Descriptive	  Deflationary	  Pluralism	  is	  true,	  in	  particular	  if	  a	  “local”	  (type	  1	  or	  type	  2)	  form	  of	  the	  view	  is	  true,	  then	  there	  may	  be	  no	  such	  outstanding	  candidate,	  and	  therefore	  indeterminacy	  is	  a	  more	  serious	  possibility.	  For	  example,	  Papineau	  (2002)	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  a	  surprisingly	  wide	  range	  of	  different	  equally	  natural	  candidate	  properties	  for	  “consciousness”	  that	  fit	  with	  our	  usage	  equally	  well,	  and	  therefore,	  according	  to	  him	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  “consciousness”	  (even	  once	  disambiguated	  as	  “phenomenal	  consciousness”)	  is	  a	  radically,	  or	  even	  
defectively,	  indeterminate	  term.	  However,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  a	  view	  like	  Epistemicism	  is	  true	  (see	  e.g.	  Williamson	  (1994)),	  on	  which	  there	  is	  no	  semantic	  indeterminacy	  and	  use	  is	  always	  sufficient	  to	  fix	  a	  determinate	  referent	  for	  every	  term	  (even	  if	  we	  can’t	  figure	  out	  what	  it	  is).	  So	  even	  if	  Deflationary	  Pluralism	  is	  true,	  “consciousness”	  could	  be	  a	  sharp	  term.	  Equivalently,	  a	  question	  that	  isn’t	  substantive	  could	  still	  be	  one	  that	  has	  a	  determinate	  answer	  (here	  I	  am	  echoing	  Sider’s	  (2011)	  discussion	  of	  this	  distinction).	  In	  general,	  the	  metaphysically	  interesting	  question	  is	  always	  whether	  a	  question	  is	  substantive,	  not	  whether	  it	  has	  a	  determinate	  answer	  –	  the	  indeterminacy	  question	  may	  at	  best	  combine	  the	  substantivity	  question	  with	  further	  questions	  about	  how	  words	  get	  their	  meaning,	  questions	  which	  aren’t	  directly	  about	  the	  language-­‐independent	  world.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  In	  most	  circumstances,	  if	  we	  have	  a	  case	  of	  vagueness	  that	  involves	  a	  sorites-­‐like	  series	  of	  cases	  along	  which	  it	  is	  unclear	  where	  the	  extensional	  boundary	  of	  a	  predicate	  lies,	  we	  know	  how	  the	  application	  of	  the	  predicate	  depends	  on	  lower-­‐level	  features	  (e.g.	  we	  know	  how	  baldness	  depends	  on	  hair	  distribution),	  and	  we	  can	  tell	  where	  the	  vague	  cases	  are	  :	  grasp	  of	  the	  predicate	  involves	  reacting	  in	  a	  “vagueness	  appropriate”	  way	  to	  the	  vague	  cases.	  Not	  so	  in	  the	  case	  of	  “conscious”,	  if	  we	  believe	  in	  an	  inferential	  gap.	  We	  could	  have	  a	  creature	  in	  a	  state	  that	  is	  vague	  case	  of	  consciousness,	  and	  know	  all	  the	  facts	  about	  the	  case	  on	  which	  the	  application	  of	  “conscious”	  depends	  (e.g.	  all	  the	  physical	  facts),	  but	  have	  wide	  range	  of	  different	  opinions	  about	  whether	  the	  creature	  is	  conscious.	  So	  if	  “conscious”	  is	  vague,	  it	  is	  a	  very	  special	  example	  of	  vagueness.	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We’ve	  now	  spent	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  time	  trying	  to	  clarify	  the	  Deflationary	  Pluralist	  view	  (although	  I	  still	  haven’t	  said	  much	  about	  what	  “significance”	  is	  in	  its	  various	  guises:	  more	  on	  that	  below).	  I	  now	  move	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  the	  view	  might	  be	  motivated.	  3	  :	  Motivating	  DP	  :	  Reductionism	  and	  the	  Epistemology	  of	  Significance	  The	  kind	  of	  argument	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  involves	  carefully	  thinking	  about	  what	  the	  correct	  epistemology	  is	  for	  the	  facts	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  a	  property,	  including	  the	  naturalness	  of	  a	  property,	  or	  its	  normative	  significance.	  My	  view	  is	  that	  taking	  a	  reductionist	  view	  could	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  this	  issue,	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  naturalness.	  Not	  only	  does	  reductionism	  mean	  that	  consciousness	  (or	  determinate	  forms	  of	  consciousness)	  lacks	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  heavyweight	  naturalness	  by	  not	  being	  a	  fundamental	  property;	  it	  also	  may	  support	  a	  certain	  epistemology	  of	  naturalness	  (and	  perhaps	  of	  other	  kinds	  of	  significance	  too),	  an	  epistemology	  which	  may	  in	  turn	  support	  a	  DP	  view.	  Recall	  that	  the	  reductionist	  holds	  that	  consciousness	  has	  a	  complex	  real	  definition	  in	  terms	  of	  more	  basic	  properties.	  This	  reductionist	  position	  has	  an	  obvious,	  but	  nonetheless	  seldom	  noted	  epistemological	  consequence.	  Even	  if	  consciousness	  has	  a	  complex	  physical	  nature,	  introspection	  doesn’t	  reveal	  to	  us	  its	  complex	  nature	  (here	  I	  am	  assuming	  that	  views	  like	  analytical	  functionalism,	  on	  which	  we	  have	  a	  priori	  access	  to	  the	  real	  definition	  of	  consciousness,	  are	  false).	  As	  a	  result,	  introspection	  leaves	  it	  opaque	  to	  us	  what	  consciousness	  really	  is.	  On	  the	  reductive	  view,	  the	  nature	  of	  consciousness,	  far	  from	  being	  “completely	  revealed”	  from	  a	  first-­‐person	  perspective	  (as	  “Cartesian”	  intuitions	  might	  suggest),	  is	  utterly	  hidden.	  To	  know	  what	  property	  consciousness	  really	  is	  requires	  explicitly	  articulating	  its	  complex	  structure,	  and	  this	  can	  only	  be	  done	  by	  using	  objective	  “third-­‐personal”	  descriptive	  resources.	  	  This	  has	  the	  following,	  somewhat	  startling	  consequence	  –	  a	  being	  that	  completely	  lacked	  consciousness	  could	  be	  in	  a	  better	  position	  than	  us	  to	  know	  what	  consciousness	  is.	  If	  they	  know	  which	  complex	  property	  our	  word	  “consciousness”	  refers	  to,	  and	  we	  don’t,	  then	  that	  is	  exactly	  the	  situation	  that	  obtains.	  For	  our	  purposes,	  the	  important	  ramification	  is	  that	  arguably	  this	  hypothetical	  being	  is	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  assess	  the	  various	  kinds	  of	  significance	  that	  consciousness	  may	  have	  than	  we	  are.	  After	  all,	  we	  don’t	  know	  what	  consciousness	  is,	  and	  they	  do	  –	  doesn’t	  that	  better	  equip	  them	  to	  assess	  its	  significance?	  Even	  if	  we	  think	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  take	  our	  beliefs	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  consciousness	  as	  ‘innocent	  until	  proven	  guilty’,	  surely	  once	  we	  discover	  its	  complex	  nature,	  it	  would	  be	  reasonable	  to	  hope	  that	  these	  beliefs	  would	  be	  3rd	  personally	  ratified.	  Furthermore,	  arguably	  if	  these	  beliefs	  fail	  to	  be	  ratified	  from	  this	  perspective,	  then	  we	  ought	  to	  reconsider	  them.	  (I’ll	  defend	  this	  idea	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  a	  moment.)	  If	  we	  accept	  this	  “demand	  for	  3rd	  personal	  ratification”,	  what	  outcome	  can	  we	  expect	  the	  process	  of	  ratification	  to	  have,	  given	  what	  we	  already	  know?	  I	  claim	  that	  we	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already	  know	  enough	  to	  be	  skeptical	  about	  whether	  our	  beliefs	  attaching	  heavyweight	  significance	  to	  consciousness	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  ratified	  from	  a	  3rd	  personal	  perspective.	  	  Imagine,	  for	  example,	  a	  super-­‐intelligent	  alien	  scientist	  looking	  at	  the	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  of	  both	  human	  beings	  and	  the	  non-­‐conscious	  aliens	  I	  mentioned	  earlier.	  Imagine	  furthermore	  that	  these	  observers	  lack	  consciousness,	  and	  they	  never	  reflect	  “from	  the	  inside”	  on	  their	  own	  psychological	  lives,	  so	  that	  their	  conception	  of	  mental	  states	  is	  purely	  theoretical.	  If	  these	  impartial	  zombie	  observers	  have	  perfect	  knowledge	  of	  both	  our	  psychological	  architecture	  and	  that	  of	  the	  unconscious	  aliens,	  are	  they	  likely	  to	  conclude	  that	  there	  is	  some	  special	  glow	  attaching	  to	  us	  humans,	  and	  not	  to	  the	  aliens?	  Similarly,	  if	  they	  describe	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  human	  brain	  at	  many	  levels	  of	  abstraction,	  are	  they	  likely	  to	  find	  a	  particular	  level	  that	  is	  outstandingly	  significant,	  the	  level	  at	  which	  consciousness	  resides?	  I	  think	  this	  is	  prima	  facie	  implausible	  (I	  will	  try	  to	  spell	  out	  in	  more	  detail	  why	  this	  is	  in	  a	  moment).	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  object	  that	  although	  the	  various	  kinds	  of	  special	  significance	  that	  attach	  to	  consciousness	  aren’t	  accessible	  to	  our	  impartial	  zombie	  observer,	  we	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  appreciate	  them,	  given	  that	  we	  have	  consciousness.	  Prima	  facie,	  this	  misses	  the	  point	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  third	  personal	  ratification.	  The	  point	  of	  the	  demand	  is	  that,	  given	  that	  consciousness	  is	  a	  complex	  physical	  property,	  the	  impartial	  observer	  is	  in	  a	  better	  epistemic	  position	  vis	  a	  vis	  its	  significance,	  even	  though	  the	  observer	  may	  lack	  consciousness,	  and	  we	  have	  it.	  	  One	  could	  challenge	  this	  claim	  however	  –	  can	  more	  be	  said	  to	  justify	  the	  link	  between	  reductionism	  and	  the	  demand	  for	  3rd	  personal	  ratification?	  A	  theorist	  who	  rejects	  the	  demand	  for	  3rd	  personal	  ratification	  is	  favoring	  what	  I	  call	  a	  “top-­‐down”	  epistemology,	  rather	  than	  a	  “bottom	  up”	  epistemology	  of	  significance	  (a	  very	  similar	  distinction	  is	  made	  by	  (Johnston	  (1997)	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  practical	  significance	  of	  personal	  identity	  with	  Derek	  Parfit).	  A	  top-­‐down	  theorist	  takes	  their	  common-­‐sense	  convictions	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  consciousness	  (convictions	  they	  may	  have	  as	  a	  result	  of	  reflecting	  on	  consciousness	  “from	  the	  inside”)	  as	  default	  justified,	  and	  argues	  that	  whatever	  physical	  property	  consciousness	  is	  identical	  with	  must	  be	  significant	  because	  it	  is	  identical	  with	  consciousness.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  “bottom-­‐up	  theorist”	  thinks	  that	  our	  beliefs	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  a	  property	  are	  in	  principle	  revisable	  given	  reflection	  on	  the	  real	  nature	  of	  the	  property:	  “Property	  P	  doesn’t	  have	  the	  kind	  of	  significance	  we	  would	  normally	  attach	  to	  consciousness;	  consciousness	  is	  property	  P;	  therefore,	  consciousness	  isn’t	  as	  significant	  as	  we	  thought	  it	  is.”	  Notice	  that	  if	  the	  bottom	  up	  perspective	  is	  right,	  it	  gives	  us	  a	  further	  insight	  into	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  certain	  questions	  about	  presence	  of	  consciousness	  in	  problem	  cases	  might	  be	  empty	  questions.	  If	  the	  3rd	  personal	  perspective	  has	  this	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  privilege,	  then	  a	  being	  who	  knows	  all	  the	  physical	  facts	  about	  how,	  say,	  a	  lobster	  functions,	  is	  in	  an	  epistemically	  ideal	  state	  for	  knowing	  everything	  that	  matters	  about	  the	  lobster.	  In	  so	  far	  as	  this	  is	  consistent	  with	  them	  not	  being	  able	  to	  know	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whether	  or	  not	  the	  lobster	  is	  conscious,	  failing	  to	  have	  this	  knowledge	  could	  not	  be	  failing	  to	  know	  anything	  significant.	  Also	  notice	  that	  if	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  it	  could	  be	  harder	  than	  it	  looks	  to	  find	  a	  non-­‐question	  begging	  starting	  point	  in	  debates	  about	  the	  viability	  of	  a	  reductionist	  view	  of	  consciousness.	  Using	  as	  a	  premise	  a	  claim	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  consciousness	  whose	  justification	  is	  based	  on	  imagining	  “from	  the	  inside”	  the	  difference	  between	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  beings	  could	  be	  using	  a	  premise	  that	  might	  be	  called	  into	  question	  if	  we	  accepted	  reductivism	  and	  the	  allegedly	  ensuing	  demand	  for	  3rd	  personal	  ratification.	  	  Admittedly	  I	  can	  imagine	  scenarios	  which	  if	  actualized	  would	  superficially	  appear	  to	  support	  the	  top-­‐down	  epistemology.	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  “Dark	  Materials”	  Trilogy	  Phillip	  Pullman	  imagines	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  golden	  dust	  that	  is	  in	  some	  sense	  the	  basis	  for	  consciousness	  10	  (Pullman	  is	  thinking	  of	  consciousness	  as	  something	  like	  self-­‐consciousness	  –	  let’s	  imagine	  that	  it	  is	  phenomenal	  consciousness	  instead).	  Our	  hero	  Lyra	  discovers	  that	  this	  dust	  is	  escaping	  from	  the	  world,	  and	  struggles	  to	  prevent	  its	  loss.	  Of	  course,	  what	  motivates	  her	  quest	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  dust	  is	  highly	  significant	  because	  it	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  consciousness.	  It	  would	  seem	  perverse	  for	  her	  to	  think	  :	  “hold	  on,	  if	  consciousness	  amounts	  to	  no	  more	  than	  the	  presence	  of	  some	  dust,	  why	  care	  about	  consciousness?”	  The	  example	  is	  misleading	  however:	  the	  main	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  the	  dust	  being	  anything	  more	  than	  the	  causal	  basis	  of	  consciousness,	  rather	  than	  literally	  constituting	  consciousness.	  Therefore,	  the	  story	  implicitly	  suggests	  that	  Property	  Dualism	  is	  true.	  If	  Property	  Dualism	  is	  true	  then	  consciousness	  is	  highly	  descriptively	  significant	  because	  it’s	  a	  fundamental	  property,	  a	  fact	  that	  would	  be	  confirmed	  through	  application	  of	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  epistemology.	  The	  dust	  would	  in	  turn	  be	  significant	  because	  of	  its	  direct	  causal-­‐explanatory	  relationship	  with	  consciousness.	  The	  example	  is	  therefore	  a	  distraction	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  discussion	  where	  we	  are	  assuming	  reductionism.	  Hawthorne	  (2007)	  objects	  to	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  epistemology,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  will	  inevitably	  deliver	  something	  like	  a	  Deflationary	  Pluralist	  view	  for	  many	  concepts	  we	  regard	  as	  significant.	  For	  example,	  one	  case	  he	  considers	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  truth.	  On	  a	  non-­‐deflationary	  (in	  Field’s	  (1994)	  sense)	  reductionist	  view	  of	  truth,	  it	  is	  a	  complex	  relation	  between	  sentences,	  thoughts	  and	  the	  like	  and	  worldly	  states	  of	  affairs.	  Presumably,	  there	  are	  small	  variations	  of	  its	  complex	  definition	  that	  correspond	  to	  nearby	  truth-­‐like	  properties,	  such	  as	  “truth*”.	  Hawthorne	  points	  out	  that	  we	  reasonably	  attach	  far	  more	  significance	  to	  truth	  over	  truth*,	  even	  though	  the	  justification	  for	  this	  is	  only	  accessible	  “from	  the	  inside”	  to	  those	  using	  the	  concept	  (e.g.	  I	  care	  whether	  it’s	  true	  that	  my	  hair	  is	  on	  fire,	  not	  whether	  its	  true*,	  because	  truth*	  is	  consistent	  with	  falsity).	  He	  concludes	  that	  something	  like	  a	  top-­‐down	  epistemology	  of	  significance	  must	  be	  correct	  for	  this	  concept,	  and	  other	  related	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Thanks	  to	  John	  Campbell	  for	  this	  example.	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concepts	  like	  “belief”	  and	  “knowledge”.	  One	  can	  imagine	  him	  extending	  the	  line	  to	  “consciousness”	  and	  other	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  To	  fully	  address	  this	  worry	  would	  require	  looking	  in	  detail	  at	  each	  of	  these	  different	  concepts,	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  plausible	  a	  DP	  view	  would	  be	  in	  each	  case,	  which	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  My	  general	  response	  is	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  the	  bottom-­‐up	  methodology	  could	  fail	  to	  be	  correct,	  given	  certain	  assumptions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  significance.	  Specifically,	  if	  the	  significance	  of	  a	  property	  is	  a	  function	  of	  its	  complex	  real	  definition	  (or	  at	  least	  of	  that	  plus	  the	  facts	  about	  its	  context	  of	  instantiation	  that	  would	  be	  accessible	  to	  a	  suitably	  well	  informed	  zombie	  Martian	  observer,	  if	  significance	  is	  context-­‐sensitive),	  it’s	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  knowing	  the	  real	  definition	  wouldn’t	  be	  an	  epistemically	  privileged	  position	  vis	  a	  vis	  significance	  (one	  alternative	  is	  that	  there	  could	  be	  an	  epistemic	  gap	  for	  significance	  without	  a	  metaphysical	  gap	  –	  more	  on	  that	  below).	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  the	  alleged	  “insight	  from	  the	  inside”	  into	  the	  significance	  of	  various	  properties	  is	  supposed	  to	  work;	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  to	  elaborate	  a	  “top-­‐down”	  epistemology	  (this	  is	  a	  topic	  that	  I	  won’t	  have	  any	  more	  to	  say	  about	  here).	  	  This	  discussion	  suggests	  the	  following	  “master	  argument”	  for	  each	  form	  of	  deflationary	  pluralism:	  (1) If	  reductive	  materialism	  is	  true,	  consciousness	  is	  a	  complex	  physical	  property.	  	  (2) If	  it	  is	  a	  complex	  physical	  property,	  then	  it	  has	  a	  hidden	  nature	  that	  is	  not	  revealed	  to	  us	  from	  a	  first	  person	  perspective.	  (3) The	  significance	  of	  a	  complex	  property	  is	  determined	  by	  its	  complex	  nature	  (perhaps	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  physical	  facts	  which	  provide	  its	  context	  of	  instantiation,	  if	  it	  is	  context-­‐sensitive).	  (4) Given	  (3),	  if	  reductive	  materialism	  is	  true,	  we	  are	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  assess	  the	  significance	  of	  consciousness	  from	  a	  3rd	  person	  perspective.	  (5) From	  a	  3rd	  person	  perspective,	  each	  form	  of	  quasi-­‐consciousness	  appears	  equally	  significant	  as	  consciousness,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  a	  different	  property	  from	  consciousness.	  (6) Therefore	  (despite	  the	  conflict	  with	  1st	  personal	  intuitions),	  if	  RM	  is	  true,	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  endorse	  deflationary	  pluralism.	  Premise	  (1)	  is	  just	  an	  elucidation	  of	  how	  I’m	  understanding	  “reductive	  materialism”,	  and	  Premise	  (2)	  ought	  to	  be	  accepted	  by	  anyone	  who	  rejects	  analytical	  materialism.	  I’ll	  now	  spend	  some	  time	  defending	  (3),	  	  (4),	  and	  (5)	  focusing	  on	  a	  version	  of	  the	  argument	  where	  the	  relevant	  “significance”	  is	  the	  “naturalness”	  or	  “joint-­‐carvingness”	  of	  consciousness.	  Is	  consciousness	  significantly	  more	  natural	  than	  other	  forms	  of	  quasi-­‐consciousness?	  Defending	  Descriptive	  Deflationary	  Pluralism	  	  Some	  readers	  will	  be	  skeptical	  about	  whether	  there	  is	  any	  notion	  of	  objective	  naturalness	  that	  succeeds	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  properties	  (one	  can	  talk	  about	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naturalness	  and	  fundamentality	  for	  other	  metaphysical	  categories	  such	  as	  facts	  and	  material	  objects,	  but	  properties	  will	  be	  our	  concern	  here).	  Following	  Goodman	  (1954),	  many	  people	  think	  that	  at	  best	  certain	  properties	  are	  particularly	  interesting	  to	  us,	  given	  our	  practical	  concerns,	  and	  the	  arbitrary	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  have	  chosen	  to	  formulate	  our	  theories.	  But	  as	  I	  understand	  it,	  this	  view	  is	  extremely	  radical	  –	  it	  says,	  in	  effect,	  that	  any	  arbitrary	  collection	  of	  actual	  and/or	  merely	  possible	  objects	  forms	  just	  as	  natural	  a	  grouping	  as	  any	  other,	  once	  we	  abstract	  away	  our	  human	  perspective.	  For	  example,	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  in	  which	  two	  electrons	  are	  objectively	  more	  similar	  than	  an	  electron	  and	  a	  banana.	  Thus	  understood,	  it	  is	  tantamount	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  world	  is	  entirely	  homogenous	  and	  lacking	  in	  objective	  structure.	  This	  is	  a	  position	  that	  I	  find	  incredible.	  In	  this	  discussion	  I’ll	  therefore	  follow	  Armstrong	  (1978)	  and	  Lewis	  (1984),	  and	  later	  authors	  in	  finding	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  exists	  some	  sort	  of	  objective	  distinction	  of	  naturalness	  between	  properties	  a	  reasonable	  theoretical	  starting	  point.	  The	  question	  then	  arises	  whether	  consciousness	  is	  distinctive	  in	  the	  naturalness	  that	  attaches	  to	  it	  (the	  reductive	  materialist	  denies	  that	  it	  is	  perfectly	  natural,	  but	  this	  leaves	  various	  options	  open).	  Merely	  believing	  in	  some	  applicable	  notion	  of	  objective	  naturalness	  leaves	  a	  lot	  open.	  For	  example,	  is	  naturalness	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing,	  or	  is	  it	  best	  understood	  in	  graded	  or	  comparative	  terms	  (see	  Sider	  (2011)	  for	  a	  defense	  of	  the	  former	  view,	  and	  Schaffer	  (2009)	  for	  a	  defense	  of	  the	  graded	  view).	  There	  is	  much	  to	  be	  said	  about	  this	  issue	  	  –	  here	  I	  will	  limit	  myself	  to	  a	  few	  points	  that	  will	  be	  important	  in	  the	  present	  context.	  The	  core	  issue	  is	  whether	  the	  naturalness	  of	  a	  high-­level	  property	  is	  a	  “further	  fact”	  about	  it,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  might	  not	  be	  accessible	  to	  our	  Martian	  observer,	  even	  given	  knowledge	  of	  the	  relevant	  physical	  facts,	  including	  knowledge	  of	  the	  real	  definitions	  of	  physical	  properties.	  If	  that	  were	  the	  case,	  consciousness	  could	  be	  much	  more	  natural	  than	  other	  physical	  properties	  with	  very	  similar	  real	  definitions	  (or	  distinguished	  by	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  naturalness),	  even	  though	  this	  fact	  is	  completely	  opaque	  to	  our	  Martian	  observer	  comparing	  us	  with	  an	  unconscious	  alien.	  To	  be	  more	  precise,	  there	  are	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  there	  could	  be	  such	  an	  epistemic	  gap	  for	  naturalness.	  One	  is	  if	  the	  naturalness	  that	  belongs	  to	  high-­‐level	  properties	  is	  
metaphysically	  primitive,	  and	  therefore	  literally	  a	  further	  feature	  of	  the	  world,	  beyond	  what	  we	  are	  imagining	  is	  known	  to	  our	  Martian.	  Another	  view	  is	  that,	  although	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  is	  a	  derivative	  property,	  our	  concept	  of	  naturalness	  makes	  it	  opaque	  how	  the	  naturalness	  facts	  depend	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  facts;	  just	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  consciousness	  itself,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  suppose	  that	  there	  might	  be	  an	  epistemic	  gap	  here	  without	  a	  corresponding	  metaphysical	  gap.	  So	  our	  Martian	  Observer,	  equipped	  with	  our	  concept	  of	  naturalness,	  wouldn’t	  necessarily	  be	  able	  to	  know	  how	  natural	  consciousness	  is,	  despite	  knowing	  all	  the	  facts	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  determining	  this.	  At	  this	  point	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  :	  what	  are	  the	  different	  views	  one	  can	  have	  of	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  –	  the	  kind	  of	  naturalness	  that	  belongs	  to	  consciousness	  on	  a	  reductive	  materialist	  view?	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One	  view	  that	  should	  be	  noted	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  a	  version	  of	  the	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  view	  that	  I’ll	  call	  “High-­‐level	  Nihilism”.	  According	  to	  the	  High-­‐level	  nihilist,	  there	  is	  an	  objective	  distinction	  between	  a	  base	  of	  fundamental	  physical	  properties	  and	  the	  rest,	  but	  there	  are	  no	  objective	  distinctions	  of	  naturalness	  between	  non-­‐fundamental	  properties	  –	  there	  are	  no	  “real	  patterns”	  in	  the	  high-­‐level	  world,	  consisting	  of	  the	  instantiation	  of	  combinations	  of	  relatively	  natural	  high-­‐level	  properties.	  If	  consciousness	  is	  a	  complex	  high-­‐level	  property,	  then	  this	  view	  obviously	  implies	  a	  highly	  deflationary	  take	  on	  its	  descriptive	  significance.	  Here	  I	  will	  assume	  that	  high-­‐level	  nihilism	  is	  mistaken,	  and	  want	  to	  consider	  the	  implications	  of	  alternative	  views	  for	  our	  argument	  for	  DP.	  There	  are	  two	  kinds	  of	  “all-­‐or-­‐nothing”	  views	  that	  allow	  for	  high-­‐level	  naturalness.	  On	  a	  view	  like	  Armstrong’s	  (1978),	  the	  “natural”	  properties	  are	  not	  just	  a	  base	  of	  fundamental	  properties	  that	  provide	  a	  determination	  base	  for	  everything	  else,	  but	  also	  include	  high-­‐level	  properties	  like	  “tree”	  and	  “human”,	  which	  are	  distinguished	  by	  being	  natural	  from	  properties	  like	  “grue”.	  I	  regard	  this	  view	  as	  implausible,	  and	  also,	  assuming	  that	  its	  proponent	  would	  classify	  some	  phenomenal	  properties	  as	  primitively	  natural,	  not	  really	  consistent	  with	  reductive	  materialism	  as	  I’m	  understanding	  it.	  So	  here	  I’ll	  just	  consider	  the	  other	  kind	  of	  “all-­‐or-­‐nothing”	  view,	  on	  which	  only	  a	  base	  of	  fundamental	  properties	  get	  to	  count	  as	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  natural	  (this	  is	  Lewis’s	  (1984)	  view).	  On	  this	  view,	  high-­‐level	  properties	  do	  get	  to	  count	  as	  more	  or	  less	  natural	  also,	  but	  only	  in	  a	  derivative	  sense	  (assuming	  that	  we	  are	  rejecting	  high-­‐level	  nihilism).	  For	  example,	  on	  Lewis’s	  version,	  the	  naturalness	  of	  a	  high-­‐level	  property	  is	  its	  length	  of	  definition	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  perfectly	  natural	  properties.	  Both	  these	  views	  contrast	  with	  a	  primitivist	  comparativist	  view	  of	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  which	  takes	  a	  comparative	  notion	  of	  naturalness	  as	  primitive,	  perfectly	  natural	  properties	  simply	  being	  those	  at	  one	  end	  of	  a	  primitive	  scale	  (see	  Schaffer	  (2009)	  for	  a	  defense	  of	  this	  view).	  	  Many	  find	  Lewis’s	  derivativist	  view	  very	  implausible,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  many	  natural-­‐seeming	  high-­‐level	  properties	  will	  have	  very	  complex	  or	  even	  infinitary	  definitions,	  delivering	  the	  result	  that	  they	  are	  less	  natural	  than	  many	  bizarre	  seeming	  properties	  with	  more	  simple	  definitions.	  Hawthorne	  (2007),	  for	  example,	  sees	  the	  problems	  with	  Lewis’s	  Derivativist	  view	  as	  a	  motivation	  for	  simply	  taking	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  as	  a	  free-­‐floating	  primitive,	  not	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  other	  terms.	  Despite	  this	  worry	  about	  Derivatist	  views,	  I’ll	  now	  argue	  as	  follows:	  (a) In	  so	  far	  as	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  take	  a	  notion	  of	  naturalness	  as	  primitive,	  we	  should	  understand	  it	  as	  an	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  notion	  that	  applies	  only	  to	  fundamental	  properties	  (and	  therefore	  not	  to	  consciousness,	  considered	  as	  a	  high-­‐level	  property)	  (b) High-­‐level	  properties	  can	  be	  rated	  for	  degree	  of	  naturalness,	  but	  only	  in	  a	  derivative	  way	  (this	  is	  equivalent	  to	  premise	  (a)	  +	  the	  rejection	  of	  high-­‐level	  nihilism).	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(c) Derivate	  degree	  of	  naturalness	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance.	  (d) The	  causal	  explanatory	  significance	  of	  a	  high-­‐level	  property	  can	  be	  determined	  from	  knowledge	  of	  the	  fundamental	  physical	  facts	  (or	  perhaps	  a	  more	  inclusive	  set	  of	  facts)–	  that	  is,	  it	  can	  be	  determined	  by	  our	  impartial	  zombie	  observer.	  (e) The	  impartial	  zombie	  observer	  will	  not	  regard	  consciousness	  as	  more	  explanatorily	  significant	  than	  other	  consciousness-­‐like	  properties.	  
Against	  the	  idea	  that	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  is	  a	  free-­‐floating	  metaphysical	  primitive	  (which	  I	  take	  to	  be	  best	  represented	  by	  a	  primitivist	  comparativist	  view),	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  things	  to	  say.	  	  First,	  some	  will	  find	  this	  view	  to	  be	  to	  be	  in	  too	  much	  tension	  with	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  reductionist	  view	  we	  are	  taking	  for	  granted	  to	  really	  take	  seriously	  in	  this	  discussion.	  	  Second,	  if	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  floats	  free	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  property,	  then	  a	  serious	  epistemological	  problem	  emerges.	  If	  our	  hyper-­‐informed	  Martian	  can’t	  see	  the	  relative	  naturalness	  of	  properties,	  why	  think	  that	  we	  can?	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  the	  primitivist	  view	  adds	  an	  interesting	  twist	  to	  the	  epistemological	  difficulties	  associated	  with	  the	  underdetermination	  of	  unobservable	  facts	  by	  observable	  facts.	  On	  a	  primitivist	  view,	  even	  once	  we	  fix	  the	  fundamental	  physical	  facts,	  there	  are	  still	  many	  epistemic	  possibilities	  for	  what	  the	  free-­‐floating	  high-­‐level	  patterns	  in	  the	  world	  are:	  we	  get	  a	  surprising	  kind	  of	  underdetermination	  in	  the	  micro	  to	  macro	  	  direction	  as	  well.	  This	  in	  turn	  adds	  a	  surprising	  extra	  dimension	  of	  uncertainty	  to	  inference	  from	  macro	  to	  micro.	  Third,	  there	  is	  a	  worry	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  and	  causal	  explanation.	  We	  presumably	  want	  to	  hold	  onto	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  suitability	  of	  a	  property	  to	  enter	  into	  causal	  explanations	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  its	  naturalness.	  But	  high-­‐level	  causal	  patterns	  are	  surely	  derivative	  from	  the	  distribution	  of	  fundamental	  facts;	  they	  aren’t	  a	  primitive	  further	  feature	  of	  the	  world	  inscrutable	  from	  the	  base.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  degree	  primitivist	  may	  have	  to	  either	  give	  up	  the	  naturalness	  /	  explanation	  connection,	  or	  adopt	  a	  kind	  of	  strongly	  anti-­‐reductionist	  view	  of	  high-­‐level	  causal	  patterns.	  	  A	  fourth	  worry	  -­‐	  if	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  is	  primitive,	  then	  arguably	  the	  facts	  about	  it	  would	  be	  completely	  precise	  (vagueness	  is	  not	  out	  there	  “in	  the	  world”);	  but	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  precise	  facts	  of	  the	  matter	  about	  the	  relative	  naturalness	  of	  say,	  being	  a	  labrador	  and	  being	  a	  rhododendron.	  Primitivism	  arguably	  introduces	  a	  kind	  of	  arbitrariness	  that	  is	  hard	  to	  accept.	  Better	  to	  think	  that	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  is	  a	  somewhat	  vague	  derivative	  notion,	  one	  that	  perhaps	  could	  be	  precisified	  in	  a	  number	  of	  equally	  good	  ways.	  All	  this	  makes	  me	  think	  that	  although	  we	  don’t	  know	  how	  to	  pull	  off	  the	  trick,	  to	  avoid	  high-­‐level	  nihilism	  in	  a	  plausible	  way,	  a	  consciousness	  reductionist	  should	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reject	  a	  Primitivist	  view	  and	  accept	  that	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  is	  derivative,	  even	  if	  not	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  simple	  Lewisian	  “naturalness	  as	  length	  of	  definition”	  view	  claims.	  	  So,	  assuming	  that	  Lewis’s	  length	  of	  definition	  view	  isn’t	  much	  of	  an	  improvement	  on	  high-­‐level	  nihlism,	  what	  alternative	  theory	  of	  derivative	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  could	  there	  be?	  As	  I	  just	  noted,	  our	  main	  grip	  on	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  seems	  to	  come	  from	  relating	  it	  to	  causal	  explanation.	  It	  is	  therefore	  plausible	  to	  think	  of	  it	  as	  just	  defined	  as	  causal	  explanatory	  significance.	  	  Now	  admittedly,	  despite	  significant	  advances	  elucidating	  the	  content	  of	  causal	  concepts	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  relations	  to	  counterfactuals	  and	  probabilistic	  concepts,	  it	  is	  very	  unclear	  how	  to	  define	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  in	  causal-­‐explanatory	  terms.	  This	  is	  especially	  clear	  if	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  task	  to	  explain	  how	  to	  derive	  the	  facts	  about	  high-­‐level	  causal	  patterns	  from	  more	  fundamental	  facts.	  In	  fact,	  there	  are	  serious	  objections	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  this	  could	  in	  principle	  be	  done11.	  Nonetheless,	  since	  I’m	  strongly	  inclined	  to	  believe	  that	  high-­‐level	  nihilism	  is	  false,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  the	  most	  plausible	  way	  to	  resist	  it,	  I	  remain	  optimistic.	  Let’s	  suppose	  then,	  that	  we	  have	  a	  grip	  on	  how	  there	  could	  be	  objective	  causal-­‐explanatory	  patterns	  that	  are	  determined	  derivatively	  by	  the	  fundamental	  physical	  facts.	  According	  to	  premise	  (d),	  these	  facts,	  and	  therefore	  the	  relative	  causal	  explanatory	  significance	  of	  different	  high-­‐level	  properties,	  are	  available	  to	  our	  Martian	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  fundamental	  physical	  facts.	  The	  plausible	  claim	  here	  is	  that	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  a	  relevant	  kind	  of	  
epistemic	  gap.	  It	  is	  plausible	  that	  if	  our	  Martian	  observer	  knows	  all	  the	  base	  level	  physical	  facts,	  they	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  compare	  the	  relative	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance	  of	  consciousness	  with	  other	  consciousness-­‐like	  properties.	  This	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  akin	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  strongly	  rationalist	  claim	  recently	  put	  forward	  by	  Chalmers	  and	  Jackson	  (2001),	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  all	  facts	  about	  the	  world	  can	  be	  derived	  a	  priori	  from	  knowledge	  of	  a	  base	  of	  fundamental	  facts	  (perhaps	  including	  the	  addition	  of	  “centering”	  information,	  to	  deal	  with	  knowledge	  of	  some	  quasi-­‐indexical	  facts,	  such	  as	  facts	  about	  individuals	  or	  natural	  kinds).	  But	  for	  our	  purposes,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  that	  anything	  this	  strong	  is	  really	  required.	  The	  intuitive	  idea	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  captured	  is	  that	  the	  significance	  of	  consciousness	  is	  optimally	  accessed	  from	  a	  3rd	  person	  perspective,	  where	  “significance”	  is	  now	  being	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  A	  serious	  worry	  with	  equating	  high-­‐level	  naturalness	  with	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance	  comes	  from	  the	  thought	  that	  the	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance	  of	  a	  property	  is	  always	  relative	  to	  an	  explanatory	  target,	  and	  that	  there	  is	  no	  objective	  sense	  in	  which	  one	  causal	  explanatory	  target	  is	  more	  objectively	  interesting	  or	  worth	  explaining	  than	  any	  other	  (notice	  that	  appealing	  to	  the	  target’s	  own	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance	  here	  will	  apparently	  just	  start	  a	  regress).	  I	  won’t	  respond	  to	  this	  worry	  here,	  merely	  noting	  that	  if	  it	  really	  has	  force,	  it	  threatens	  us	  with	  high-­‐level	  nihilism	  again.	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understood	  as	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  base	  including	  not	  just	  information	  about	  the	  fundamental	  facts,	  or	  the	  relevant	  derivation	  not	  being	  strictly	  a	  priori.	  The	  only	  question	  remaining	  then,	  is:	  would	  our	  Martian	  think	  that	  consciousness	  has	  outstanding	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance?12	  More	  specifically,	  I	  take	  that	  the	  question	  is	  :	  does	  consciousness	  play	  an	  outstandingly	  significant	  role	  in	  causally	  explaining	  our	  behavior,	  or	  any	  other	  important	  aspect	  of	  our	  lives,	  such	  as	  our	  formation	  of	  beliefs	  and	  desires?13.	  A	  truly	  satisfactory	  answer	  would	  involve	  looking	  at	  the	  complete	  story	  about	  what	  actually	  happens	  in	  people’s	  brains	  when	  they	  have	  conscious	  experiences,	  a	  story	  of	  which	  we	  only	  have	  the	  sketchiest	  outline.	  It	  is	  therefore	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  address	  the	  question	  this	  way.	  I’ll	  have	  to	  limit	  myself	  to	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  some	  key	  points	  of	  a	  more	  abstract	  kind,	  which	  I	  hope	  will	  persuade	  that	  the	  relevant	  deflationary	  pluralist	  view	  is	  at	  least	  plausible.	  The	  background	  assumption	  I’ll	  make	  here	  is	  the	  widely	  held	  view,	  elaborated	  by	  a	  number	  of	  authors	  including	  Block	  (1995),	  that	  explanations	  in	  empirical	  psychology	  are	  functional	  analyses.	  The	  brain	  can	  be	  functionally	  analyzed	  at	  many	  levels	  of	  detail	  (including	  at	  the	  neurophysiological	  level)	  and	  psychological	  similarity,	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense,	  consists	  in	  sharing	  a	  functional	  description.	  If	  we	  think	  of	  psychological	  properties	  or	  natural	  kinds	  as	  those	  properties	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  systems	  are	  psychologically	  similar,	  then	  on	  this	  picture	  we	  enjoy	  very	  many	  psychological	  properties:	  a	  set	  of	  inter-­‐defined	  functional	  properties	  will	  exist	  at	  each	  of	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  functional	  description	  that	  can	  be	  given	  of	  us.	  	  This	  suggests	  a	  kind	  of	  Deflationary	  Pluralism	  for	  type	  (2)	  properties	  :	  the	  view	  that	  different	  levels	  of	  description	  of	  our	  cognitive	  architecture	  are	  not	  such	  that	  one	  level	  –	  the	  level	  at	  which	  one	  can	  specify	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  consciousness	  –	  has	  special	  causal	  explanatory	  significance.	  The	  reason	  this	  has	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Admittedly,	  it	  is	  at	  best	  unclear	  whether	  our	  intuitions	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  consciousness	  are	  very	  well	  represented	  by	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  has	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance.	  Speaking	  personally,	  I	  would	  say	  that	  this	  is	  not	  what	  I	  had	  in	  mind;	  even	  if	  consciousness	  was	  completely	  epiphenomenal,	  it	  might	  still	  have	  the	  kind	  of	  significance	  I	  was	  thinking	  about.	  So	  it’s	  not	  clear	  that	  maintaining	  that	  (e)	  is	  true	  is	  even	  inconsistent	  with	  anything	  common-­‐sense	  has	  to	  say	  about	  consciousness.	  Still,	  if	  the	  only	  viable	  defense	  against	  deflationary	  pluralist	  view	  of	  the	  naturalness	  of	  consciousness	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance,	  then	  denying	  (e)	  might	  be	  the	  only	  way	  to	  indirectly	  defend	  common	  sense.	  	  13	  Of	  course,	  if	  these	  things	  are	  themselves	  cosmically	  insignificant,	  having	  this	  relation	  to	  them	  may	  not	  support	  the	  view	  that	  consciousness	  is	  objectively	  significant	  –	  see	  footnote	  9.	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prima	  facie	  plausibility	  is	  as	  follows.	  More	  abstract	  functional	  descriptions,	  and	  the	  corresponding	  functional	  properties,	  tend	  to	  have	  more	  explanatory	  generality,	  encompassing	  more	  instances,	  telling	  us	  the	  broad	  architectural	  details	  of	  the	  system.	  As	  we	  fill	  in	  more	  detail,	  we	  lose	  this	  generality,	  but	  we	  gain	  much	  insight	  from	  the	  increase	  in	  information	  about	  how	  the	  system	  functions.	  It	  seems	  doubtful	  that	  there’s	  any	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  about	  how	  to	  trade	  off	  these	  different	  explanatory	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages,	  nor	  that	  they	  will	  weigh	  up	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  one	  level	  of	  description	  will	  stand	  out.	  Without	  actually	  looking	  at	  the	  details	  of	  human	  psychology,	  this	  is	  the	  main	  reason	  to	  be	  suspicious	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  consciousness	  is	  outstandingly	  explanatory.	  For	  type	  (3)	  properties,	  the	  basic	  idea	  of	  the	  deflationist	  will	  be	  something	  like	  this	  :	  assuming	  that	  Superficialism	  fails,	  then	  an	  unconscious	  alien	  or	  robot	  could	  have	  states	  that	  share	  some	  of	  the	  causal-­‐explanatory	  features	  of	  conscious	  states,	  without	  themselves	  being	  conscious	  states.	  It’s	  implausible	  to	  think	  that	  the	  relevant	  internal	  states	  of	  the	  alien	  have	  much	  less	  explanatory	  significance	  wrt	  to	  their	  internal	  life	  and	  behavior	  than	  conscious	  states	  have	  for	  our	  behavior.	  Of	  course,	  there	  is	  undoubtedly	  far	  more	  of	  interest	  to	  be	  said	  about	  the	  explanatory	  role	  of	  consciousness	  vs	  that	  of	  other	  similar	  properties:	  in	  many	  ways,	  these	  remarks	  are	  embarrassingly	  brief.	  At	  this	  point,	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  an	  important	  objection	  to	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  that	  focuses	  on	  one	  particular	  way	  in	  which	  explanations	  involving	  consciousness	  might	  be	  special.	  This	  will	  involve	  connecting	  the	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance	  of	  consciousness	  with	  its	  epistemic	  significance,	  an	  important	  topic	  for	  further	  discussion.	  It	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  if	  we	  are	  thinking	  of	  behavior	  as	  mere	  bodily	  movements,	  then	  it	  is	  pretty	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  no	  level	  of	  analysis	  of	  our	  cognitive	  architecture	  that	  is	  privileged	  for	  explaining	  these	  movements,	  for	  the	  reasons	  I	  just	  gave.	  But	  suppose	  we	  switch	  our	  attention	  from	  mere	  bodily	  movements	  to	  intentional	  actions,	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  explanation	  we	  are	  interested	  from	  ordinary	  mechanistic	  causal	  explanation,	  to	  intentional	  causal	  explanation:	  explanation	  in	  terms	  of	  content-­‐bearing	  states	  like	  beliefs	  and	  intentions.	  Perhaps	  the	  fact	  that	  certain	  objects	  are	  intentional	  systems	  is	  in	  some	  way	  an	  objectively	  significant	  property	  of	  them,	  and	  the	  “level	  of	  description”	  which	  corresponds	  to	  picking	  out	  their	  intentional	  states	  can	  reasonably	  be	  thought	  to	  stand	  out	  as	  special.	  Moreover,	  suppose	  it’s	  true	  that	  consciousness	  has	  an	  ineliminable	  role	  to	  play	  in	  intentional	  
explanation,	  so	  that	  only	  conscious	  beings	  can	  correctly	  have	  their	  behavior	  explained	  in	  this	  way.	  That	  would	  plausibly	  make	  consciousness	  genuinely	  special.	  Let	  me	  contrast	  two	  different	  ways	  of	  developing	  this	  picture,	  one	  of	  which	  I	  think	  is	  more	  promising	  than	  the	  other.	  On	  the	  pure	  functionalist	  picture,	  intentional	  states,	  including	  conscious	  states,	  are	  partly	  individuated	  by	  their	  functional	  roles,	  and	  intentional	  explanation	  is	  really	  just	  a	  species	  of	  purely	  causal	  explanation.	  The	  main	  explanatory	  role	  that	  distinguishing	  mental	  states	  by	  their	  contents	  is	  playing,	  is	  to	  give	  us	  information	  about	  their	  causal	  powers,	  powers	  which	  then	  come	  into	  play	  in	  explaining	  a	  subject’s	  behavior	  or	  changes	  in	  their	  mental	  states.	  If	  this	  is	  all	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there	  is	  to	  intentional	  explanation,	  then	  it’s	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  there’s	  anything	  particularly	  distinctive	  about	  the	  states	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  it	  (even	  if	  there	  is	  something	  distinctive	  about	  the	  way	  we	  pick	  them	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  contents),	  or,	  more	  importantly,	  why	  consciousness	  would	  be	  needed	  in	  order	  for	  states	  that	  can	  play	  this	  kind	  of	  causal	  role	  to	  exist.	  This	  latter	  point	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  already	  have	  a	  practice	  of	  assigning	  contents	  to	  the	  states	  of	  completely	  unconscious	  subsystems	  of	  the	  brain,	  a	  practice	  that	  can	  reasonably	  be	  interpreted	  as	  involving	  a	  purely	  functional	  kind	  of	  intentional	  explanation	  of	  this	  kind.	  A	  contrasting	  picture	  is	  the	  epistemic	  picture,	  according	  to	  which	  intentional	  explanation	  is	  not	  purely	  causal,	  but	  also	  involves	  explaining	  why	  the	  relevant	  behavior	  or	  mental	  states	  are	  reasonable	  or	  rational:	  it	  has	  a	  normative	  component.	  This	  would	  make	  it	  a	  genuinely	  distinctive	  kind	  of	  explanation.	  Furthermore,	  if	  it	  were	  true	  that	  consciousness	  is	  required	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  rationalizing	  explanation	  to	  be	  applicable,	  then	  that	  might	  explain	  what	  is	  distinctively	  special	  about	  consciousness.	  There	  is	  even	  a	  prima	  facie	  case	  that	  consciousness	  is	  required	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  explanation:	  we	  do	  not	  think	  that	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  apply	  epistemic	  notions	  like	  reasonability	  or	  rationality	  to	  subpersonal	  states	  that	  are	  remote	  from	  consciousness,	  even	  if	  we	  attribute	  contents	  to	  them	  and	  invoke	  them	  in	  a	  form	  of	  intentional	  explanation.	  One	  way	  to	  justify	  withholding	  rational	  assessment	  from	  subpersonal	  states	  would	  be	  to	  appeal	  to	  a	  link	  between	  phenomenal	  consciousness	  and	  rationality	  (see	  Smithies	  (ms.)	  for	  a	  forceful	  defense	  of	  this	  position).	  This	  response	  moves	  us	  away	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  consciousness	  is	  special	  because	  it	  has	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  explanatory	  significance	  in	  a	  purely	  causal	  sense,	  to	  a	  view	  on	  which	  it	  is	  special	  in	  an	  epistemic	  sense.	  Is	  there	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  conscious	  experience	  is	  outstandingly	  epistemically	  significant,	  or	  is	  a	  form	  of	  Deflationary	  Pluralism	  the	  correct	  view	  in	  this	  area	  as	  well?	  Unfortunately,	  I	  don’t	  have	  space	  here	  to	  adequately	  address	  this	  question,	  and	  will	  have	  to	  limit	  myself	  to	  a	  few	  brief	  remarks	  about	  how	  I	  see	  the	  discussion	  continuing	  at	  this	  point	  (see	  Lee	  (manuscript)	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  consciousness).	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  senses	  in	  which	  conscious	  experience	  might	  be	  thought	  to	  have	  special	  epistemic	  significance.	  Here	  I’ll	  briefly	  discuss	  just	  one	  of	  them	  :	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  are	  certain	  types	  of	  beliefs	  –	  say,	  perceptual	  beliefs	  or	  introspective	  beliefs	  –	  that	  can	  only	  be	  justified	  if	  they	  are	  based	  on	  a	  conscious	  experience.	  For	  example,	  it	  might	  be	  held	  that	  there	  are	  objective	  epistemic	  norms	  governing	  the	  formation	  of	  perceptual	  beliefs,	  that	  imply	  that	  only	  perceptual	  beliefs	  formed	  be	  endorsing	  the	  contents	  of	  phenomenally	  conscious	  perceptual	  experiences	  can	  be	  justified.	  If	  all	  is	  dark	  within,	  you	  cannot	  really	  be	  justified	  in	  believing	  anything	  about	  your	  environment.	  Against	  this,	  one	  might	  claim	  that	  an	  unconscious	  alien	  with	  consciousness-­‐like	  perceptual	  states	  could	  in	  principle	  have	  perceptual	  beliefs	  that	  were	  equally	  justified	  as	  ours	  –	  they	  could	  be	  “epistemically	  quasi-­‐conscious”.	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How	  might	  one	  argue	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  epistemic	  quasi-­‐consciousness?	  Clearly	  our	  unconscious	  alien	  could	  form	  perceptual	  beliefs	  that	  are	  just	  as	  reliable	  as	  ours.	  But	  we	  should	  note	  that	  we	  needn’t	  lean	  on	  a	  crude	  form	  of	  reliablism	  about	  justification	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  alien	  has	  justification.	  There	  will	  be	  many	  internal	  structural	  similarities	  between	  us	  and	  the	  alien,	  and	  so	  many	  theories	  of	  justification	  with	  an	  internalist	  component	  (i.e.	  one	  that	  requires	  a	  justified	  belief	  to	  stand	  in	  certain	  internally	  specifiable	  relations	  to	  other	  internal	  states)	  may	  well	  be	  satisfied	  by	  the	  alien’s	  beliefs	  also.	  It	  looks	  like	  rejecting	  the	  view	  that	  our	  alien	  is	  justified	  will	  require	  a	  brute	  appeal	  to	  consciousness	  as	  an	  essential	  epistemic	  ingredient,	  not	  merely	  a	  rejection	  of	  reliabilism	  about	  justification.	  	  Another	  point	  is	  that	  an	  opponent	  of	  epistemic	  quasi-­‐consciousness	  will	  have	  to	  make	  a	  case	  that	  they	  aren’t	  mistaking	  local	  for	  global	  significance:	  it	  may	  be	  that	  for	  
us	  humans,	  conscious	  experience	  is	  required	  for	  justification	  –	  for	  example,	  in	  close	  worlds	  where	  I	  don’t	  consciously	  experience	  a	  blue	  cup	  in	  front	  of	  me,	  I’m	  not	  justified	  in	  believing	  such	  a	  cup	  is	  present.	  Could	  there	  be	  an	  illegitimate	  slide	  from	  a	  correct	  local	  claim	  of	  this	  kind,	  to	  an	  ill-­‐founded	  global	  claim?	  	  More	  generally,	  what	  exactly	  would	  justify	  believing	  that	  consciousness	  is	  essential	  for	  justification?	  Arguably,	  the	  opponent	  of	  epistemic	  quasi-­‐consciousness	  will	  have	  to	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  simply	  inconceivable	  that	  an	  unconscious	  being	  could	  have	  justified	  perceptual	  or	  introspective	  beliefs.	  But	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  no	  incoherence	  or	  conceptual	  confusion	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  epistemic	  quasi-­‐consciousness,	  or	  at	  least	  so	  I	  would	  argue.	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly	  (and	  as	  I	  mentioned	  earlier)	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  our	  ordinary	  view	  is	  that	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  consciousness	  is	  grounded	  in	  its	  natural	  significance:	  i.e.	  conscious	  acquaintance	  with	  the	  external	  world	  and	  our	  own	  mental	  lives	  is	  a	  completely	  different	  kind	  of	  natural	  phenomenon	  from	  zombie	  acquaintance.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  deep	  natural	  difference	  here	  though,	  that	  puts	  pressure	  on	  these	  reasons	  for	  believing	  in	  an	  important	  epistemic	  difference.	  To	  sum	  up	  :	  the	  naturalness	  of	  a	  high-­‐level	  property	  is	  best	  understood	  not	  as	  a	  primitive	  further	  fact	  about	  it,	  but	  as	  a	  derivative	  fact,	  in	  particular	  it	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  its	  causal-­‐explanatory	  significance.	  It	  seems	  plausible	  that	  our	  detached	  Martian	  would	  be	  able	  to	  compare	  the	  explanatory	  significance	  of	  consciousness	  with	  instances	  of	  pseudo-­‐consciousness,	  and	  would,	  at	  least	  in	  some	  cases,	  regard	  them	  as	  equally	  significant	  –	  or	  so	  I	  argued.	  I	  considered	  the	  objection	  that	  there	  is	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  intentional	  explanation	  of	  our	  behavior	  that	  involves	  rationalizing	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  intentional	  states,	  and	  that	  only	  a	  conscious	  being	  could	  correctly	  have	  their	  behavior	  explained	  in	  this	  special	  way.	  This	  opens	  the	  door	  for	  further	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  conscious	  experience	  in	  epistemology;	  I	  briefly	  mentioned	  some	  reasons	  for	  doubting	  the	  claim	  that	  conscious	  experience	  is	  essential	  for	  certain	  beliefs	  such	  as	  perceptual	  beliefs	  to	  be	  justified.	  This	  ends	  my	  positive	  case	  for	  a	  form	  of	  Deflationary	  Pluralism.	  I	  conclude	  by	  mentioning	  a	  few	  ways	  in	  which	  what	  I’ve	  said	  invites	  further	  discussion.	  
	   26	  
	  Connections	  and	  Questions	  for	  Further	  Discussion	  What	  impact	  does	  Deflationary	  Pluralism	  have	  on	  other	  debates	  about	  consciousness,	  for	  example	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  alleged	  Hard	  Problem	  of	  consciousness,	  and	  the	  philosophical	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  empirical	  search	  for	  neural	  correlates	  of	  consciousness?	  	  On	  the	  latter	  issue,	  DP	  may	  give	  us	  an	  extra	  reason	  to	  be	  skeptical	  about	  the	  resolvability	  of	  certain	  empirical	  questions	  about	  the	  physical	  basis	  of	  consciousness	  :	  it	  rules	  out	  a	  view	  on	  which	  one	  consciousness-­‐like	  physical	  property	  is	  much	  more	  natural	  than	  others	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  in	  principle	  accessible	  to	  suitably	  well-­‐placed	  scientific	  observer:	  there	  will	  be	  no	  ethereal	  glow	  attached	  to	  one	  property,	  telling	  us	  that	  it	  is	  the	  elusive	  “factor	  X”	  (I’m	  sure	  this	  is	  obvious	  to	  most	  people,	  but	  it	  is	  worth	  making	  explicit).	  Related	  to	  this,	  if	  some	  form	  of	  DP	  is	  true,	  then	  certain	  questions	  about	  the	  physical	  basis	  of	  consciousness	  (or	  determinate	  forms	  of	  consciousness)	  could	  be	  less	  substantive	  than	  they	  appear.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  we	  have	  a	  group	  of	  consciousness-­‐like	  physical	  or	  functional	  properties,	  and	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  decide	  which	  one	  really	  is	  consciousness.	  Perhaps	  this	  isn’t	  a	  substantive	  question	  and	  should	  be	  ignored.	  Interestingly,	  conclusions	  like	  this	  might	  in	  turn	  might	  support	  a	  perspective	  on	  which	  the	  real	  problems	  understanding	  consciousness	  are	  more	  philosophical	  than	  empirical.	  For	  example,	  even	  if	  the	  question	  “which	  of	  these	  physical	  /	  functional	  properties	  is	  identical	  with	  consciousness?”	  is	  to	  some	  degree	  empty,	  there	  might	  remain	  a	  legitimate	  philosophical	  question	  –	  how	  could	  any	  physical	  or	  functional	  property	  -­‐	  including	  these	  properties	  -­‐	  be	  identical	  with	  consciousness?	  Finally,	  let	  me	  mention	  a	  couple	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  DP	  impacts	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  hard	  problem	  of	  consciousness.	  First,	  some	  materialists	  who	  accept	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  inferential	  gap	  have	  tried	  to	  defend	  their	  view	  by	  arguing	  that	  they	  can	  account	  for	  our	  epistemic	  situation	  vis	  a	  vis	  consciousness	  in	  completely	  materialistically	  acceptable	  terms,	  without	  being	  able	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap.	  Chalmers	  (2006)	  argues	  against	  this	  approach	  as	  follows:	  (1)	  even	  if	  materialism	  is	  true,	  zombies	  are	  still	  conceivable,	  (2)	  zombies	  are	  not	  in	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  situation	  as	  us	  vis	  a	  vis	  their	  experiences.	  Conclusion	  :	  the	  materialist	  can	  only	  explain	  our	  epistemic	  situation	  by	  explaining	  why	  we	  aren’t	  zombies,	  which	  would	  seem	  to	  require	  closing	  the	  (apparent)	  inferential	  gap.	  As	  Chalmers	  himself	  concedes,	  the	  argument	  assumes	  that	  when	  we	  conceive	  of	  a	  zombie,	  we	  conceive	  of	  a	  being	  that	  is	  in	  an	  epistemically	  impoverished	  state	  compared	  with	  us.	  But	  if	  epistemic	  DP	  is	  true,	  some	  zombies	  are	  epistemically	  quasi-­‐conscious,	  so	  these	  two	  conceptions	  don’t	  necessarily	  go	  together.	  Chalmers	  does	  try	  to	  finesse	  this	  problem,	  but	  in	  my	  view	  more	  discussion	  is	  needed	  here.	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Second,	  I	  think	  there	  is	  a	  strand	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  that	  can	  be	  deflated	  once	  we	  accept	  a	  deflationary	  pluralist	  view.	  One	  thing	  that	  might	  make	  a	  physical	  /	  functional	  property	  seem	  puzzlingly	  ill-­‐suited	  to	  being	  the	  basis	  of	  consciousness	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  “specialness	  mismatch”	  intuition	  –	  any	  physical	  or	  functional	  property	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  obviously	  just	  one	  of	  a	  large	  family	  of	  properties	  that	  are	  similar	  in	  one	  respect	  or	  other,	  and	  it	  might	  seem	  completely	  arbitrary	  that	  it	  is	  this	  property	  rather	  than	  that	  one	  that	  is	  the	  elusive	  “factor	  X”	  that	  is	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  consciousness.	  The	  Deflationary	  Pluralist	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  treat	  this	  problem	  –	  they	  can	  explain	  away	  the	  apparent	  mismatch	  by	  downgrading	  the	  specialness	  of	  consciousness.	  To	  be	  clear,	  I	  certainly	  don’t	  think	  that	  this	  completely	  removes	  or	  deflates	  the	  explanatory	  gap.	  There	  will	  remain	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  can	  imagine	  factor	  X	  occurring	  without	  consciousness,	  however	  much	  knowledge	  we	  have	  of	  our	  physical	  constitution	  and	  relations	  to	  our	  environment.	  And	  it	  will	  still	  be	  true	  that	  there	  will	  be	  positive	  reasons	  for	  finding	  it	  unintelligible	  how	  conscious	  states	  could	  be	  just	  the	  same	  as	  any	  physical/functional	  states.	  Still,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  interest	  of	  Deflationary	  Pluralism	  does	  extend	  to	  shedding	  light	  on	  the	  cluster	  of	  issues	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  consciousness	  is	  subject	  to	  an	  explanatory	  gap.	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